The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma by Hylton, Maria O\u27Brien
BYU Law Review
Volume 1992 | Issue 4 Article 14
11-1-1992
The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health
Care for the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma
Maria O'Brien Hylton
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Health Policy Commons, Insurance Law
Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L.
Rev. 971 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1992/iss4/14
The Economics and Politics of 
Emergency Health Care for the Poor: 
The Patient Dumping Dilemma 
Maria O'Brien Hylton* 
''When you're well, you lose the sense of how really hard i t  is 
to be sick."' 
All I can say is this: i t  looks a s  if we are all we have. 
Given what we know about ourselves and each other, this is 
an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect; looking around the 
world, i t  appears that if all men are brothers, the ruling 
model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor love, nor even 
terror, seems to have worked to make us "good," and worse 
than that, there is no reason why anything shouldO2 
Claudia Thomas was nineteen years old and eight months 
~regnant .~  She was unemployed and had a two-year-old son, 
Eric, at home. Her husband, Steven, worked periodically, but 
none of his jobs offered health benefits for him, let alone 
Claudia and the kids. For this reason, Claudia had not seen a 
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. Harvard, 
1982; J.D. Yale, 1985. Thanks are due to Keith N. Hylton, Frances Miller, Jane 
Rutherford, and Mike Jacobs for reviewing earlier drafts of this paper. Charles 
Dyke, Rein Krammer, and D o ~ a  Welch provided excellent research assistance. The 
Dean's Research Fund of the DePaul College of Law generously supported this 
research. All the usual disclaimers regarding errors and opinions apply. 
1. Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, May 13, 1991, at  29-30. 
2. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 
1249. 
3. This "story" represents an amalgamation of several real incidents (which 
culminated in litigation) involving uninsured pregnant women who were "dumped" 
on public institutions in spite of life-threatening medical conditions. See, e.g., 
Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990); 
Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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doctor during the entire length of her pregnancy. 
One morning Claudia began having cramps and nausea 
that seemed worse than usual. By noon she knew that 
something was wrong. She called her mother to ask her to 
watch Eric while she went to the clinic, but her mother was not 
available. She decided to wait until evening when Steven came 
home. By the time Steven arrived her contractions were 
painful, even though she was a month away from her due date. 
Claudia was bleeding and went to the emergency room of a 
nearby private hospital. Before she could see a doctor, she was 
asked to fill out several forms and answer questions about her 
insurance coverage and about her medical treatment during the 
pregnancy. Once it became obvious to the admitting nurse that 
Claudia did not have health insurance, another nurse was 
called in. She told Claudia that she would be "better off' at the 
county hospital, which was some 15 miles &stant. Claudia 
demanded to see a doctor, saying that something was wrong 
and she was worried about the baby. 
Finally, she was led back and told to wait for the doctor. 
After 15 minutes, Claudia saw a doctor who told her that she 
would not be admitted because she had not dilated sufficiently. 
However, he decided to run some tests to make sure the baby 
was all right. Although the tests suggested that the baby was 
experiencing some distress, the doctor assured Claudia that 
there was plenty of time before the baby would be born, and 
that the best place, for a case like hers, was County Hospital. 
Despite Claudia's protests, the doctor refused to admit her. 
Reluctantly, she departed for County Hospital by taxi. On the 
way to the hospital she delivered a premature baby girl in the 
taxi. The infant died shortly thereafter of cardiac and 
respiratory complications. The doctor who treated her at 
County Hospital believes that if she had been admitted to the 
private hospital and received the proper care the baby would 
have survived. Claudia believes that she would have been 
admitted to the private institution had she had medical 
insurance or other proof of ability to pay. 
As the numbers of uninsured mount4 because of job 
4. The estimates vary. See Erik Eckholm, Health Benefits Found to Deter 
Switches in Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at Al, B12 ("[Tlhe uninsured [are] 
now estimated at about 34 million Americans."); David Orentlicher & Kristen 
Halkola, The Growing Inaccessibility to Prenatal Care for Poor and Minority 
Women: A Crucial Problem for Makers of National Health Policy, in ONE NATION, 
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dislocations, exhaustion of benefits, and unaffordably high 
premiums, the incidence of "dumping" by private hospitals is, 
predictably, on the rise. Dumping occurs when a hospital, in 
violation of federal or state law, transfers an  emergency patient 
to another (usually public) hospital or simply refuses any 
treatment based on the patient's inability to pay.5 In addition 
to the completely uninsured, favorite dumping targets include 
Medicare and Medxaid patients, AIDS patients, and cancer 
patients whose therapy may cost more than the maximum 
reimbursement under private insurance. 
Dumping is merely a part of what is commonly referred to 
as the "health care crisis" which, in turn, is really a crisis 
involving two related, but distinct, issues: access and cost. 
There are two common themes to the complaints about health 
care voiced by consumers, insurers, providers, and politicians. 
These are (1) its high (and growing) cost and (2) the fact that 
millions have no access to good, consistent care because they 
are uninsured. Dumping is a blatant example of the difficulties 
the under- and uninsured face in securing access to health 
care. 
All dumped patients represent potentially significant, 
uncompensated costs to the hospital that decides to refuse 
treatment.%d, as health care costs have risen7 the problem 
INDIVISIRLE: THE CML RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990S, a t  216, 228 (Reginald 
C. Govan & William L. Taylor eds., 1989) ("In 1988, thirty-seven million people, or 
about 15 percent of the total population in the United States, went without health 
insurance .*). 
5. See Emily Friedman, The "Dumping" Dilemma: The Poor Are Always With 
Some of Us, HOSPITALS, Sept. 1, 1982, at 51, 52; Karen J. Treiger, Note, 
Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA'S Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1186, 1186-87 (1986). 
6. As one observer has noted: 
As economic pressures on hospitals grow and hospital managers are 
encouraged-or forced-to act Like businessmen concerned primarily with 
profit margins, more and more patients will be denied access to  urgently 
needed care simply because they c a ~ o t  pay for it. In theory, all private 
hospitals, whether investor-owned or voluntary, acknowledge an obligation 
to provide emergency care for any acutely ill indigent patients brought to 
their doors-at least until such patients can be 'stabilized' (whatever that 
means) and safely transferred to a public hospital. That sounds 
reassuring, but in practice many very sick patients are denied adequate 
care. 
Arnold S. Relman, Economic Considerations in Emergency Care: What Are Hospitals 
For?, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 372, 372 (1985). 
7. Since 1980, health care expenditures in the United States have risen each 
year. Amounts spent per year, in billions of dollars: 1980-249.1; 1981-288.6; 1982- 
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has become acute. While the incessant rise in health care costs 
has been variously blamed on ever-changing, expensive 
technologies: malpractice liability, an increasingly older 
population, and physician greed: it has been suggested that 
many of the current problems can be traced t o  Reagan-era 
developments. lo 
I t  is important to keep in mind, though, that dumping is 
not a new phenomenon. As Emily Friedman has noted: 
[A] historian a t  the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
points out that 
in the period from 1850 to 1870, the scandal of which 
voluntary hospitals were most afraid was that resulting 
from the death of a patient in an ambulance during a 
transfer to a municipal hospital. The newspapers would 
reveal the transfer, and because everyone assumed that 
private hospitals had public responsibilities, it would be 
seen as inhumane. But from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, when voluntary hospitals were first 
323.8; 1983-356.1; 1984-387.0; 1985-420.1; 1986-452.3; 1987-492.5; 1988-544.0; 1989- 
604.1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1991 Table 136 
(11th ed. 1991). 1990 expenditures were $666.2 billion. David A. Ridenour, 
Compared to Canada, Health Care in the U.S. Is a Bargain, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 
13, 1992, a t  All .  Estimates for 1991 and 1992 were $737.9 billion and $817.0 
billion respectively. Mark A. Hofmam, Health Care Spendiqq to Rise 10.7% in '92, 
Government Predicts, Brrs. INS., Jan. 6, 1992, a t  3. 
For general background and discussion of health care economics, see VICTOR R. 
FvCHS, THE HEALTH ECONOMY (1986); HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN 
THE 1980s: TIME OF TRANSITION (J.B. Silvers et al. eds., 1983); ISSUES IN HEALTH 
ECONOMICS (Roice D. Luke & Jeffrey C. Bauer eds., 1982); PHILIP JACOBS, THE 
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE (1980); HERBERT E. -MAN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH (1965); JOHN RAPOPORT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING HEALTH 
ECONOMICS (1982); RESEARCH IN HEALTH ECONOMICS (Richard M. Scheffler ed., 
1979); MICHAEL D. ROSKO & ROBEWT W. BROYLES, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH 
CARE (1988); THE PRICE OF HEALTH (George J. Agich & Charles E. Begley eds., 21 
Philosophy & Medicine, 1986); KENNETH E. WARNER & BRYAN R. LIKE, COST- 
BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE (1982). 
8. Blayne Cutler, Health Scare, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1990, at 11, 11 
("As medical techniques become more sophisticated, costs soar."). 
9. D e ~ i s  L. Breo, Tough Talk from the President's Physician, 262 JAMA 
2742, 2744-45 (1989) (Dr. Burton J. Lee 111, President Bush's physician, believes 
that in  order to control medical costs, the United States must "cut[] out the waste, 
some of which is motivated by physician greed."). 
10. See, e.g., Chris Black, Increase in Homeless Families Linked to Worsening of 
Pouerty, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1989, at 12; Robert Pear, Studies of Welfare Cuts 
Assess Harm to Elderly, N.Y. RMES, Mar. 19, 1982, a t  20; Reagan's Medicare Plan 
Is Cruel Hawc, Offers Little Help, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1987, a t  C15; Rebecca 
Trounson, Convention '92, Bush: The Record, Race and Poverty, HOLJSTON CHRON., 
Aug. 20, 1992, at B1; infia note 20. 
9711 PATIENT DUMPING DILEMMA 975 
established, they had the ability to define which patients 
they did not want to treat: the chronic and incurable, the 
"morally unworthy," alcoholics, patients with venereal 
disease. Many of them would not take children, either, 
or pregnant women seeking hospital rather than home 
care, because they were usually prostitutes. It has been 
a strange symbiosis between the public and private 
sectors. l1 
Thus, private hospitals in the United States have a long 
tradition of avoiding, when they can, economically undesirable 
patients. Given the existence of taxpayer-supported public 
hospitals whose principal task is to care for public patients at 
public expense, some have suggested that public hospitals are 
the appropriate places for the poor: 
[Wle see many patients who self-refer, because they know 
they will be treated here if they do not have insurance. We 
also receive referrals from physicians' offices of patients who 
do not have insurance. I do not consider either of these to be 
"dumping." That's what we receive tax support for; that's part 
of our mission.12 
In the early 1980s many states tightened up eligibility 
requirements for Medicaid in response to federal cuts and 
dramatic increases in the cost of running the program.13 
11. Emily Friedman, Problems Plaguing Public Hospitals: Uninsured Patient 
Transfers, Tight Funds, Mismanagement, and Misperception, 257 J A M .  1850, 1850 
(1987). 
12. Id. 
13. Medicaid came into existence when President Lyndon Johnson signed Public 
Law No. 89-97 in 1965. It is jointly subsidized by federal and state governments, 
providing funding for selected health care services for the blind, disabled, and 
families receiving aid to dependent children. Emily Friedman, Medicare and 
Medicaid at 25, HOSPITALS, Aug. 5, 1990, at 38. 
Although Medicaid has brought many uninsured Americans into the fold of 
coverage of health care expenses, it does not cover all expenses; nor are benefits 
consistent between states. By 1972, 17.6 million Americans were covered under the 
program; by 1977, 22.9 million; by 1988, 22.9 million remained covered; by 1989, 
the number of covered Americans dipped to 21.6 million. Id. Beneficiaries, however, 
face major out-of-pocket expenses, and what expenses they find covered varies from 
state to state. Medicaid is a state-level entitlement which has led to patchwork 
coverage within certain limits between states in terms of services, eligibility, and 
payment. Id. at  38-46. 
Over the years, state government responsibility for public health expenditures 
has varied from about 12 to 14%, while federal government responsibility has 
varied from about 11 to 30%. See id. a t  50. This has led to a power struggle 
between the national and state governments in terms of who will pay what, who 
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However, by 1983, when Medicare began to curtail payments 
as well, finchng a solution to the dumping problem took on new 
urgency. In that year Congress passed Social Security 
amendments14 creating the diagnostic related group (DRG) 
reimbursement system, which pays providers a predetermined 
rate for 470 diagnostic cla~sifications.'~ DRGs do not pay the 
provider an amount directly related to the actual cost of 
treating a particular patient; the provider is reimbursed a set 
amount based on the DRG which covers the patient's condition. 
If the provider keeps costs low, the portion of the 
reimbursement which is not actually expended on the patient 
represents pure profit. Thus, providers have an economic 
incentive to undertreat Medicare patients in order to make a 
windfall. This incentive becomes more powerful as the 
percentage of a hospital's completely unreimbursable care rises, 
making Medicare patients ever more likely to be undertreated 
or treated quickly and discharged early so that the provider 
will cover what, and who is actually running the program. In 1965, for example, 
New York covered approximately half of its population with Medicaid. As a 
reaction to this generosity, Congress passed legislation which promptly prohibited 
such benevolence. On the other hand, over the years the states have been reducing 
or freezing eligibility limits while Congress has looked the other way. In the early 
1980s, federal support waned and the states followed suit. However, in the mid- 
1980s, Congress began to expand eligibility while some states were reluctant to do 
so. These states found themselves giving in to federal pressure. By the late 1980s, 
stress on strapped state budgets from increased eligibility and skyrocketing costs 
forced the cutting of provider payments. This has threatened some providers' 
survival and has reduced physician participation. Id. 
The costs of funding Medicaid have increased substantially since its inception. 
Some have proffered that "basing payment on 'reasonable costs' without some effort 
at  cost control" would guarantee that the program would become prohibitively 
expensive. Such prophesies were quickly realized. Id. at  38, 42. Even so, Medicaid 
has ended up costing vastly more than anyone had predicted. In 1972, total 
payments were $6.3 billion; by 1988, the total was $48.7 billion. Id. at  46. 
Controlling its growth has proven difficult. Congress began passing legislation to 
control costs even before some states had implemented the program. Such reform 
has included mandatory quality oversight in the form of professional standards, 
review organizations, and peer review organizations; health planning through 
health systems agencies; reconfiguration of the hospital payment system; and 
recently the passage of legislation aimed at  physicians' payment based on a 
resource-based relative value scale. Id. at  42. The continued rise in the program's 
costs will probably lead to additional legislation changing eligibility requirements, 
funding, and cost control. 
14. 42 U.S.C. 5 1395ww (1988). 
15. For a good discussion of DRGs, see Marshall B. Kapp, Legal and Ethical 
Implications of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 LAW 
MED. & HEALTH CARE 245 (1984); see also John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: 
The American Health Care System, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 962, 966 (1992). 
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may keep costs below the DRG reimbursement amount. 
In the early 1980s private health insurers began to devise 
methods for curtailing price increases. The proliferation of 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)'' and Preferred 
Provider Organizations (PPOs)17, were part of this effort. Like 
the proponents of DRGs, supporters of HMOs argued that fee- 
for-service payment schemes were largely responsible for the 
unrelenting inflation in health care costs. HMOs contract with 
providers on a prepaid basis and guarantee a variety of 
services to subscribers who generally make periodic, fixed 
payments for comprehensive health services. 
PPOs enter into contractual arrangements with employers 
or insurance companies and health care providers. The PPOs 
operate on a fee-for-service basis, but providers prenegotiate 
rates with insurance companies or employers contracting for 
their services. 
The combined effect of cost cutting and management in the 
1980s on the part of Medicaid,18 Medicare, and private 
insurers has made it virtually impossible for hospitals to pass 
on the costs of indigent, unreimbursable care to other, paying 
patients. Not surprisingly then, the 1980s saw a huge increase 
in patient dumping as hospitals scrambled to avoid the most 
undesirable of all emergency patients: those with serious, 
expensive-to-treat emergency conditions with no prospect for 
payment. 
This article examines the patient dumping phenomenon 
16. For a short, nontechnical discussion of HMOs, see EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 209-15 (4th ed. 
1990). According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), "[als of July 
1, 1989, there were an estimated 590 HMOs covering 32.5 million people." Id. a t  
209. 
17. EBRI describes PPOs as "contractual arrangements, generally between 
health care providers and an employer or insurance company to provide fee-for- 
service health care, usually a t  a discount." Id. a t  217. The major distinction 
between HMOs and PPOs is that the former are organizations which provide 
service on a prepaid basis; PPOs are contractual relationships which arrange for 
coverage on a fee-for-service basis. 
18. Several other very serious problems exist with respect to the Medicaid 
program. In particular there is ample evidence that the low reimbursement rates 
have discouraged many physicians from participating in the program, making 
access difficult even for those who remain covered. See Susan Garner, Increasing 
Clients' Access to Medicaid Providers: New Developments, 18 CLEARINGHOtJSE REV. 
1269, 1270 (1985); Robert Pear, Low Medicaid Fees Seen a s  Depriving the Poor of 
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, a t  A1 ("Medicaid pays doctors about 69 percent of 
what Medicare paid, and an even smaller proportion of what private insurers 
paid."). 
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and explains why the federal legislation that was supposed to 
end dumping of emergency patients has failed. Section I1 
reviews the federal and state regulatory frameworks which 
ostensibly prohibit all emergency dumping. Section I11 
describes the most important characteristics of the market for 
health insurance and explains the tremendous reluctance of 
hospital providers to deal with uninsured consumers. This 
section also focuses on a troubling question. Why is it that 
complaints about the present health care system consistently 
raise two seemingly contradictory issues: first, that we 
overspend on health care; and second, that the health needs of 
many are not being met? The answer, I conclude, is that in 
spite (and because) of well-intentioned but excessive regulation 
of the health insurance market, access is unnecessarily limited. 
I argue that the elimination of burdensome regulations would 
actually decrease the number of uninsured and ease the 
dumping problem. 
Section IV examines several important dumping cases in 
light of the model presented in Section 111. These narratives 
demonstrate that dumping is a serious problem that has 
proven fatal on many occasions. In addition, there is a review 
of the incentives that encourage hospitals to dump and a 
suggestion that the total elimination of dumping is not 
politically feasible and ought to be abandoned. Absent a scheme 
of universal health insurancelg (which would presumably 
19. Several plans have been unfurled as proposed cures to the health care 
crisis. Among them is President Bush's plan which calls for a so-called voucher 
system. Under the plan, working families earning less than $14,300 annually would 
receive vouchers worth as much as $3750 to pay health insurance premiums. 
Middle-class families earning up to $80,000 a year could deduct premiums of as 
much as $3750 from their federal tax returns. David Ellis, Rx Band-Aids to Patch 
Up Health Care, TIME, Feb. 17, 1992, a t  20. In addition, employers could not turn 
down employee applicants because of their preexisting health status. Id. 
Several other plans have been proposed in Congress. The first, universal health 
care, calls for the government to set minimum care for all Americans while 
"[plrivate companies would continue to offer coverage to workers under employer- 
paid plans and could devise policies to defray the costs of risky or experimental 
procedures." Id. at  21. A similar plan is the "single-payer" system in which private 
insurers would be replaced by the government, who would also regulate physician 
fees. Id. (This is the system currently in place in Canada.) 
Another plan is "play or pay" which "would require businesses with 25 or more 
employees to provide worker coverage or pay a 7% payroll tax for the uninsured. 
To hold down spending on common medical procedures, a federal board would 
monitor fees and streamline the claim process." Id. 
The final proposal is the "managed care" plan. "This approach is designed to 
maximize the clout of consumers by encouraging them to organize into groups to 
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eliminate the large pool of uninsured), an interim solution is 
needed. The most popular solution, which proposes to increase 
both the penalties and the likelihood of detection for violators 
of the federal antidumping statute, is unworkable and 
potentially very harmful. I propose first to reduce the pool of 
uninsured by encouraging private insurers to do business with 
the profitable segments of this market; those who remain in 
the pool should receive a subsidy from the state to pay for 
health insurance coverage, the contours of which would be 
politically determined. 
Section V contains a summary of the arguments presented 
and a conclusion. This article does not purport to evaluate 
ways in which all-inclusive health care services could be 
provided to the working and nonworking poor. Nor is this a 
paper that proposes reform of the Medicaid program. The focus 
here is not on cost, but on access, and specifically access to 
emergency care. To the extent that the demand for emergency 
room services can be decreased via the provision of cost- 
effective preventive care:' the issues discussed here obviously 
affect the broader questions of comprehensive health care 
reform. 
[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit.21 
negotiate with health providers and insurers. Employers, providers of group 
insurance, and agencies representing the poor and unemployed would aggressively 
lobby for lower-cost coverage." Id. at  22. 
20. This is indisputably true, for example, with respect to prenatal care. Study 
after study has mncluded that the risk of expensive, emergency procedures is 
significantly decreased when a pregnant woman has access to early, regular 
prenatal care. For an excellent discussion of the link between poverty and low 
birth weight and infant mortality, and for a review of the data, see Orentlicher & 
Halkola, supra note 4, at  216-46. Moreover, 
the Reagan administration's relentless crusade to cut the budget for 
domestic social policies without regard to the financial consequences has 
produced a situation in which America will spend more money than was 
"saved" by slashing federal health finding, at least in terms of prenatal 
care . . . . This sad fact becomes tragic when one considers that more 
money could be saved by correcting the causes for these burdens than by 
ignoring or aggravating them. 
Id. at 237. 
21. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). 
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A. Federal Initiatives 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Hospital Survey and Con- 
struction (Hill-Burton) This legislation required hospi- 
tals which received federal funds for construction and capital 
improvements to furnish a "reasonable" amount of free or re- 
duced-cost care to indigent patients for a period of twenty 
years, and to make their services available to all persons resid- 
ing in the community. There is widespread agreement that this 
program has been a complete failure with respect to increasing 
the supply of indigent care.23 This failure has been attributed 
to, among other things, ambiguity about what constitutes an  
"emergency," ineffective enforcement mechanisms, and the 
absence of sanctions for noncomplian~e.~~ As we shall see, the 
very same conditions have likewise doomed Congress's only 
other explicit attempt to secure emergency indigent care-the 
COBRA amendments of 1986. 
The antidumping rules set forth in the Consolidated Omni- 
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)25 became ef- 
fective on August 1, 1986, and established a duty on the part of 
hospitals that have emergency rooms and participate in the 
Medicare program26 to provide emergency indigent care in ei- 
ther of two situations: an "emergency medical condition" or 
"active labor."27 It  is important to note that the COBRA rules 
do not require a hospital to treat nonemergency cases or to 
continue treatment after the emergency condition has been 
22. 42 U.S.C. $9 291 to 2910-1 (1988). In 1979 Congress finally adopted regula- 
tions establishing specific dollar amounts of uncompensated care to be rendered 
annually. See 42 C.F.R. $9 124.501-.512, .601-.607 (1991). 
23. See Andrew J. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal 
Act Against Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 198 n.107 (1989) 
("Federal enforcement of Hill-Burton, left to the Department of Health and Human 
Services Office of Health Facilities, has been dismal. The sigruficance of Hill-Burton 
diminishes each year as  more and more hospitals complete their twenty-year obli- 
gation. By 1990, the number of hospitals required to provide uncompensated health 
care under Hill-Burton is expected to drop to 1,000, and, by 1995, to 400.") (citing 
Michael A. Dowell, Hill-Burton: The Unfulfilled Promise, 12 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y 
& L. 153 (1987)); Treiger, supra note 5, at 1198. 
24. See Phillip Green, Note, COBRA: Another Patch on a n  Old Garment, 33 ST. 
Lorr~s U. L.J. 743, 768 (1989). 
25. 42 U.S.C. 5 1395dd (1988). 
26. Czrrently, about 90% of all hospitals registered with the American Hospital 
Association participate in the Medicare program. AMERICAN HOSP. ASS%, AHA HOS- 
PITAL STATISMCS 202 Table 10A (1991). 
27. See 42 U.S.C. 9 1395dd(b)(l) (1988). 
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stabilized. In other words, it is completely lawful, under these 
federal regulations, to dump indigent patients who are not in  
active labor and who are in stable condition. 
The statute contemplates that a covered hospital will do a n  
"appropriate medical screening examination" to determine 
whether either of these two triggering conditions exist.28 CO- 
BRA defines "active labor" as "labor at a time a t  wh ich iA)  
delivery is imminent, (i) there is inadequate time to effect safe 
transfer to another hospital prior to delivery, or (ii) a transfer 
may pose a threat of [sic] the health and safety of the patient 
or the unborn child."2g 
An "emergency medical condition" is 
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of 
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the ab- 
sence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be 
expected to result in- 
(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, 
(B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or 
( C )  serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." 
A transfer of a patient who is in an unstable medical condi- 
tion or who is in active labor may still be appropriate if quali- 
fied medical personnel certify that the benefits of the transfer 
outweigh its  risk^.^' If a transfer is to take place, the transfer- 
ring hospital must send relevant medical records with the pa- 
tient and provide appropriate equipment and personnel during 
the transfer. In addition, the receiving hospital must agree to 
take the patient and have the appropriate space and personnel 
for treatment.32 
Penalties for failure to comply with the statute include 
termination of the hospital's Medicare provider agreementS3 
and fines of up to $50,000 for each violation by a physician or 
28. Id. 9 1395dd(a). 
29. Id. 8 1395dd(e)(l)(B). 
30. Id. 1395dd(e)(l). 
31. The responsible person must certify that 
based upon the information available at the time, the medical benefits 
reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment 
at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual's 
medical condition from effecting the transfer and, in the case of labor, to 
the unborn child from effecting the transfer. 
Id. 8 1395dd(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
32. Id. 9 1395dd(c)(2)(A). 
33. Id. § 1395dd(d)(l). 
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hospital.34 Termination of a hospital's Medicare provider 
agreement is by far the more serious penalty for dumping. 
Medicare revenues account for about 40% of total participating 
hospitals' revenues.35 The statute also creates a private cause 
of action for victims of dumping and affected institutions (i.e., 
receiving hospitals) who may recover damages and other appro- 
priate equitable relief.36 However, experience suggests that 
few dumping victims or receiving institutions ever complain 
about the practice of dumping. Judith Waxman, of the National 
Health Law Program, has testified before Congress that 
[olne other inadequacy of the [antidumping] law has been 
brought to our attention by hospitals that are dumped on. 
[These] are the facilities that receive the inappropriate trans- 
fers regularly. While the Federal law allows them to bring a 
private right of action against the hospitals that dumped on 
them, they are very hesitant to do that. They are often in the 
same hospital association with the other hospitals in their 
area, and political pressures prevent them from suing their 
ass~ciates.~' 
In 1989, Congress amended the antidumping statute. An 
"emergency medical condition" was expanded to include: 
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms 
of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the 
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be 
expected to result in- 
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect 
to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or the 
unborn child) in serious jeopardy, 
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or 
(iii) serious dishct ion of any bodily organ or part; or 
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having 
contractions- 
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer 
to another hospital before delivery, or 
34. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)(B). 
35. Bush Health Plan Attacked, Defended, REUTERS, Feb. 18, 1992, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(B). 
37. Equab Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearing Before a Subcom- 
mittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1987) [hereinafter Equal Access to Health Care] (testimony of 
Judith Waxman, Managing Attorney, National Health Law Program). 
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(ii) the transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety 
of the woman or the unborn 
The amendments also specify that a hospital may not delay 
a medical screening exam or stabilizing treatment in order to 
determine whether the patient is indigent,39 and must provide 
treatment to stabilize the emergency conditions and labor;40 a 
physician must also include a summary of the risks and bene- 
fits upon which the certification for transfer was made41 and 
both physicians and hospitals must satisfy significantly ex- 
panded record-keeping  requirement^.^' The amendments also 
contain a provision which protects a physician who refuses to 
transfer a patient (because she believes the patient has an 
emergency medical condition and has not been stabilized) from 
adverse action by the h~spital.'~ 
B. The Failure of Federal Regulation 
Not long after the 1986 COBRA Amendments went into 
effect, their many weaknesses became apparent. Because oth- 
ers have catalogued these problems e l s e ~ h e r e ? ~  I describe 
them only briefly. Essentially, the 1986 antidumping statute 
suffered from four serious defects: first, a flawed scheme for re- 
porting dumping incidents; second, the use of vague terms 
having no precise medical meaning; third, weak penalties for 
failure to comply; and fourth, a refusal on the part of its draft- 
ers to come to terms with the market forces that encourage 
dumping. The 1989 amendments to the statute attempt to 
address the first and second issues, but ignore the remaining 
two. Thus, if experience with past regulation is any guide, the 
new amendments are not likely to decrease the amount of 
dumping. 
Under the statute, the Inspector General (IG) and the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) share responsi- 
bility for enforcement. HCFA is authorized to terminate hospi- 
tals from the Medicare program, and the IG may assess civil 
38. 42 U.S.C. $ 1395dd(e)(l) (Supp. I 1989). 
39. Id. $ 1395dd(h). 
40. Id. $ 1395dd(b). 
41. Id. $ 1395dd(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
42. Id. $ 1395cc(a)(l)(I). 
43. Id. $ 1395dd(i). 
44. See, e g . ,  Treiger, supra note 5, at 1209-21 (detailing weak enforcement and 
vague statutory language). 
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fines for violations. The IG's office has commented that it has 
no way of knowing how much dumping occurs, because " 'it can 
only act on what is reported to it.'"" Perhaps the crucial re- 
porting problem concerns the fact that hospitals need not re- 
port incidents of dumping, and many apparently do not. Public 
Citizen's Health Research Group (PCHRG) notes that there has 
been " 'a tragic failure of HHS [Health and Human Services] 
responsibility to  punish and deter violations of [COBRA] as 
Congress intended.' "*' A spokesman for PCHRG estimates 
that about 250,000 incidents of patient dumping occur each 
year, in large part "because there is now no requirement for 
hospitals to report dumping cases."17 
The present distinctions between the departments' duties 
mainly concern the investigative process. HCFA is responsible 
for investigating patient dumping complaints. If the HCFA 
investigation determines that the hospital or physician has 
acted out of compliance, HCFA will refer it to  the IG. The IG 
and HCFA may then act upon the violation by imposing their 
respective penalties or fines. Beyond this, the duties and re- 
sponsibilities of the HCFA and the IG are not clearly defined. 
At this time, the HHS is attempting to promulgate rules clearly 
specifying HCFA and IG duties and responsibilities. Neither 
department is currently responsible for reporting cases of pa- 
tient dumping beyond those brought before them in the form of 
complaints and completed investigations." 
Additionally, the definitional problems with key words in 
the statute such as "serious impairment," "active labor," and 
"emergency medical condition" are well known.49 The 1989 
amendments include changes designed to  clear up some of the 
confusion generated in 1986; however, Congress has yet to 
45. Health Care, Public Citizen Calls HHS' Enforcement of Patieat Dumping Act 
"Tragic Failure", Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 79, at A14 (Apr. 24, 1991) 
(quoting Judy Holtz, IG spokeswoman). 
46. Id. (quoting Public Citizen Director Sydney M. Wolfe). 
47. Id. 
48. Telephone Interview with Mike Blank, Complaint Investigator at HCFA 
(confirmed Jan. 11, 1993). 
49. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 23, at 197-204; "Patient Dumping" After Co- 
bra, [ Oct. 19881 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 37,436, at 18,215 (following -a 
study of emergency room and other hospital records in October 1987, the IG rec- 
ommends that the HCFA "clarify the definition of what constitutes 'stabilization' 
and 'emergency condition.' "); Treiger, supra note 5, at 1209-16; Danielle L. 
Trostorff, King Cobra Recoils: The Effect of the OBRA 1989 Technical Amendments 
on Health Care Providers and Regulators, 37 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 442, 444 (1990). 
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adopt terminology which would presumably be most meaning- 
ful to emergency room personnel-the definitions of the Ameri- 
can College of Emergency Physicians." 
The 1989 amendments do not change COBRA'S original 
scheme of penalties for failure to comply, although the penal- 
ties now apply to a somewhat expanded list of hospital and 
physician obligations, particularly with respect to record keep- 
ing.51 It  is important to note that the maximum civil fine re- 
mains $50,000 for knowing violations. 
By far the more serious potential penalty is exclusion from 
the Mehcare program. However, because enforcement has been 
notoriously poor, many hospitals do not appear to take this 
threat seriously. As of June 30, 1991, HHS's Office of Survey 
and Certification reported 756 complaint investigations had 
been authorized since August 1986. "Of these, 710 investiga- 
tions have been completed, . . . 517 hospitals have been found 
in compliance, 180 out-of-compliance and 13 are under review. 
Of the 180 found out-of-compliance, 7 hospitals [listed] have 
been terminated from the Medicare program."52 Of these sev- 
en, the report states, three were recertified-two in 1988 and 
one in  1 9 8 9 . ~ ~  
One can only guess a t  the reasons for terminating (and 
then only for a short period of time) the Medicare provider 
agreements of only seven out of 180 hospitals found guilty of 
dumping. From the hospitals' perspective, this fact suggests 
that, even when dumping occurs, the chance that HHS will 
terminate the provider agreement is less than four percent.54 
Anecdotal however, suggests that HHS is generally 
loathe to impose this harshest penalty, even for a short period 
of time. Whatever the motivation, though, of the regulators in 
declining to terminate provider agreements (even i n t h e  face of 
60. American College of Emergency Physicians, Definition of Emergency Medi- 
cine, 10 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 385-88 (July 1981). 
51. See Trostorff, supra note 49, at 447. 
52. Memorandum from Anthony J. Tirone, Director, Office of Survey and Certif- 
ication, to Associate Regional Administrator, Division of Health Standards and 
Quality, Regions I-X, Dumping Log Investigation Status as of June 30 ,  1991 (on 
file with author). 
53. Id. 
54. This figure is arrived at by dividing the total number of known wrongdoers 
(180 hospitals that dump) into the number of hospitals that actually had their 
Medicare provider agreements terminated (albeit for a short time period): 7 divided 
by 180 = .03888, or about 4%. 
55. See infra Section IV. 
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evidence that dumping has occurred), it seems clear that a 
consensus has yet to emerge at HHS about whether and how to 
use the termination sanction. 
The government's hesitancy with respect to imposing the 
harshest sanction is no doubt intensified by the most serious 
defect in the statute-it attempts to force presumably rational 
economic actors t o  behave in a manner that is at odds with 
self-interest. Patient dumping occurs because hospitals cannot 
afford to give unlimited amounts of uncompensated care. Pro- 
hibiting patient dumping without addressing its underlying 
causes is thus doomed to failure. 
C. State Initiatives 
While this article focuses primarily on federal regulations, 
it is worth noting that more than half of the states have stat- 
utes which purport to regulate patient transfers." Some, like 
the Texas statute, are well drafted5? but, unfortunately, rarely 
56. See infia Appendix: State Statutes Regulating Patient Transfers. 
57. The Texas statute, for example, reads: 
(a) The board shall adopt rules to implement the minimum standards 
governing the transfer of patients . . . . 
(b) The rules must provide that patient transfers between hospitals should 
be accomplished . . . in a medically appropriate transfer[] from physician 
to physician and from hospital to hospital by providing: 
(1) for notification to the receiving hospital before the patient is 
transferred and confirmation by the receiving hospital that the 
patient meets the receiving hospital's admissions criteria relating to 
appropriate bed, physician, and other services necessary to treat the 
patient; 
(2) for the use of medically appropriate life support measures that 
a reasonable and prudent physician exercising ordinary care in the 
same or similar locality would use to stabilize the patient before 
the transfer and to sustain the patient during the transfer; 
(3) for the provision of appropriate personnel and equipment that a 
reasonable and prudent physician exercising ordinary care in the 
same or a similar locality would use for the transfer; 
(4) for the transfer of all necessary records for continuing the care 
for the patient; and 
(5) that the transfer of a patient not be predicated on . . . economic 
status. 
(c) The board.may not adopt minimum standards that require the consent 
of the patient . . . before the patient is transferred. 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 5 241.027 (West 1992). 
Enforcement for violations is provided in $8 241.053-.056. (Note that the pen- 
alties include temporary restraining order, denial, suspension or revocation of a 
hospital's license, andlor injunctive relief. Also, injured persons may be entitled to 
civil damages.) Section 241.053(a) provides that "[tlhe department may deny, sus- 
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used.58 Other state statutes, like those in Nevadasg and 
pend, or revoke a hospital's license if the [state's health] department finds that the 
hospital: (1) failed substantially to comply with this chapter or a rule or standard 
adopted under this chapter; or (2) aided, abetted, or permitted the commission of 
an illegal act." 
Section 241.054(b)-(c) provides: 
(b) After . . . notice and opportunity to comply [has been issued to a 
hospital for a violation], the department may petition a district court . . . 
for assessment and recovery of the civil penalty provided by Section 
241.055, for injunctive relief, or both. 
(c) The department may petition a district court for a temporary restrain- 
ing order to restrain a continuing violation if the department finds that 
the violation creates an immediate threat to the health and safety of the 
patients of a hospital. 
Section 241.055 provides: "(a) A hospital shall: (1) timely adopt, implement, and 
enforce a patient transfer policy in accordance with Section 241.027 . . . . (b) A 
hospital that violates subsection (a) is liable for a civil penalty of not more than 
$1000, for each day of violation and for each act of violation." 
Section 241.056 provides: "(a) A person who is harmed by [failure of a hospital 
to timely adopt, implement, or enforce a patient transfer policy in accordance with 
5 241.0271 . . . may petition a district court for appropriate injunctive relief . . . . 
(c) The person may also pursue remedies for civil damages under common law." 
58. According to Mary White, administrative technician in the Hospital Licens- 
ing Program of the Texas Health Facility Licensure and Certification Division [Li- 
censure Department], the Licensure Department had referred eight complaints (five 
between 1987 and 1989, and three in 1992) to the Texas Attorney General for 
prosecution under the state statute. According to Ms. White, no action was taken 
on the five referred between 1987 and 1989 and, similarly, no action has thus far 
been taken on the three referred in 1992. 
59. For relevant portions of NEV. REV. STAT. 5 439B.410 (1987), see infra Ap- 
pendix: State Statutes Regulating Patient Transfers. In addition, Nevada provides 
for enforcement in NEV. REV. STAT. 5 439B.410(3) (1987): 
A physician, hospital or other health facility which treats a patient as a 
result of a violation . . . by a hospital or a physician working in the 
hospital is entitled to recover from that hospital an amount equal to 
three times the charges for the treatment provided that was billed by the 
physician, hospital or other health facility which provided the treatment, 
plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
Furthermore, 5 439B.410(6) provides that 
[ijf an allegation of a violation . . . is made against a hospital . . . , the 
health division of the department of human resources shall conduct an 
investigation of the alleged violation. Such a violation, in addition to any 
criminal penalties that may be imposed, constitutes grounds for the deni- 
al, suspension or revocation of [the hospital's license], or for the imposi- 
tion of any sanction prescribed in NRS 449.163. 
Section 449.163(1) provides that the health division may 
(a) Prohibit the facility from admitting any patient . . . ; 
(b) Limit the occupancy of the facility to the number of beds occupied 
when the violation occurred . . . ; 
(c) Impose an administrative penalty of not more than $1000 per day for 
each violation, together with interest thereon at a rate not to exceed 10 
percent per annum; and 
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Californias0 have also been used infrequently. 
(d) Appoint temporary management to oversee the operation of the facility 
and to ensure the health and safety of the patients of the facility. 
Section 439B.410(7) provides that 
[ilf an allegation of a violation . . . is made against a physician licensed 
to practice medicine . . . , the board of medical examiners shall conduct 
an investigation of the alleged violation. Such a vjolation, in addition to 
any criminal penalties that may be imposed, constitutes grounds for initi- 
ating disciplinary action or denying licensure. 
Only one case has been brought pursuant to the Nevada statute. 
SHEPARD'~/MCGRAW-HILL, NC., SHEPARD'S NEVADA CITATIONS (1988 & Supp. Jan. 
1993). 
60. For relevant portions of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $5 1317, 1317.2 
(Deering 1990), see infra Appendix: State Statutes Regulating Patient Transfers. In 
addition, 8 1317.6 provides for enforcement: 
(a) Hospitals found by the state department to have committed or to be 
responsible for a violation of this article . . . shall be subject to a civil 
penalty by the state department in an amount not to exceed twenty-five 
thousand dollars ($25,000) for each hospital violation. 
. . . .  
(c) Physicians and surgeons found by the board to have committed, or to 
be responsible for, a violation of this article . . . shall be subject to a 
civil penalty by the board in an amount not to exceed five thousand dol- 
lars ($5,000) for each violation. A civil penalty imposed under this subdi- 
vision shall not duplicate federal fines, and the board shall credit any 
federal fine against a civil penalty imposed under this subdivision. 
(d) The board may impose fines when it finds any of the following: 
(1) The violation was knowing or willful. 
(2) The violation was reasonably likely to result in a medical haz- 
ard. 
(3) There are repeated violations. 
. . . .  
(f) There shall be a cumulative maximum limit of thirty thousand dollars 
($30,000) in fines assessed against hospitals under this article and under 
Section 1395dd of Title 42 of the United States Code for the same cir- 
cumstances. 
(g) Any hospital found by the state department . . . to have committed a 
violation of this article . . . may have its emergency medical service per- 
mit revoked or suspended by the state department. 
(h) Any administrative or medical personnel who knowingly and inten- 
tionally violates any provision of this article, may be charged by the local 
district attorney with a misdemeanor. 
. . . .  
(j) Any person who suffers personal harm and any medical facility which 
suffers a fmancial loss as a result of a violation of this article . . . may 
recover, in a civil action against the transferring or receiving hospital, 
damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and other appropriate relief. Transfer- 
ring and receiving hospitals from which inappropriate transfers of persons 
are made or refused in violation of this article . . . shall be liable for the 
reasonable charges of the receiving or transferring hospital for providing 
the services and care which should have been provided. Any person po- 
tentially harmed by a violation of this article . . . or the local district 
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New York's infrequent enforcement efforts appear to be 
typical. Recently, New York initiated its second ever criminal 
prosecution under a 1983 statute that makes it ille- 
gal-punishable by up to one year in prison-for hospitals or 
health care personnel to  refbse emergency treatment? The 
most recent incident involved a resident doctor at Harlem Hos- 
pital, a public facility, who allegedly refused to admit a woman 
in labor who then gave birth in the hospital's waiting room. 
This is apparently the first instance in which New York has 
charged a doctor under the statute-the only other prosecution 
involved a nurse-and the peculiarity of the entire affair seems 
lost on everyone except the doctors. The executive director of 
the union representing the residents and interns noted recent- 
ly: "It is indeed ironic that the very law our members support- 
attorney or the Attorney General, may bring a civil action against the 
responsible hospital or administrative or medical p e r s o ~ e l  to enjoin the 
violation, and if the injunction issues, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
Only six cases have been brought pursuant to the California statute. 
SHEPARD'SMCGRAW-HILL, INC., SHEPARD'S CALIFORNIA CITATIONS (1988 & Supps. 
Feb. 1992, Dec. 1992, Jan. 1993). 
There is evidence which suggests that the dumping problem in California is 
severe and deteriorating. The Los Angdes Times reported in 1986 that a recent 
study of patient transfers to the San Bernardino County Medical Center showed 
that 91% of the transfers were for economic reasons, and that 31 of 423 patients 
transferred (or about 7%) were in unstable condition at the time of the transfer. 
Robert Steinbrook, Hospital "Dumping" of Poor: Lawmakers Seek a Cure, LA. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1986, at  3, 15; see also $300,000 Won In Patient Case, L.A. DAILY 
J., Feb. 4, 1991, at  3 (uninsured patient discharged from hospital despite symp- 
toms of life-threatening illness collapses and dies 15 hours later). 
61. For relevant excerpts of N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW $ 2805-b (McKi~ey  1985 
& Supp. 1992), which makes it illegal for hospitals and health care personnel to 
refuse emergency medical care to patients requesting such treatment, see infka 
Appendix: State Statutes Regulating Patient Transfers. Sedion 2805-b(2)fi) estab- 
lishes a criminal penalty for such a violation: 
Any licensed medical practitioner [in cities with a population of one mil- 
lion or more] who refuses to treat a person arriving at a general hospital 
to receive emergency medical treatment who is in need of such treatment; 
or any person who in any manner excludes, obstructs or interferes with 
the ingress of another person into a general hospital who appears there 
for the purpose of being examined or diagnosed or treated; or any person 
who obstructs or prevents such other person from being examined or di- 
agnosed or treated by an attending physician thereat shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and subject to a term of imprisonment not to exceed one 
year and a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars. 
In addition, $ 2805-b(2Xa) provides that any hospital, in cities with a popula- 
tion of one million or more, which fails to provide "emergency medical care and 
treatment to  all persons in need of such care or treatment who arrive at  the . . . 
hospital[,]" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. 
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ed to prevent medically indigent patients from being dumped 
from private hospitals is being used to persecute a doctor em- 
ployed a t  a public hospital which takes care of everyone."62 
While any number of factors may have motivated the doc- 
tor in question to refuse care, including the fact that the 
hospital's emergency room was overcrowded, it is hard to be- 
lieve that the patient's uninsured status played any role in the 
incident. The targets of the legislation were private facilities 
that cannot turn to the taxpayer to absorb the costs of uncom- 
pensated care, not public hospitals such as Harlem or their 
house staff. 
In any event, the only other New York dumping prosecu- 
tion involved a nursing supervisor who refused emergency room 
care to an 81-year-old who was subsequently stabilized a t  an- 
other hospital.63 Again, it is hard to believe that the nurse 
was responding to anything other than hospital protocol when 
she refused the patient on the grounds that her physician was 
not a i l i a ted  with the institution. In other words, if this was a 
case of dumping it almost surely was not the fault of the nurse. 
The hospital had existing instructions on how to proceed, which 
she was merely obligated to respect.B4 Nonetheless, the nurse 
was fined $500 and sentenced to 200 hours of community ser- 
vice. 
Because some of the state statutes suffer from the same 
vagueness that plagues the federal law,65 state prosecutorial 
62. Lisa Belkin, Harlem Hospital Doctor Faces "Dumping" Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 1992, at B3. 
63. A Nurse Is Sentenced for Denying Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1989, at 
B8. 
64. According to George Ernis of the Bureau of Hospital Services, New York 
State Health Department, Parkway Hospital was never fined for the incident. The 
Health Department, after an investigation, issued deficiencies against the hospital, 
requiring that it submit a plan of correction. The plan was ultimately accepted by 
the health department and no subsequent fine was imposed. In addition, there was 
no explicit finding that the procedures followed by the nurse were standard hospi- 
tal policy or procedure. Telephone Interview with George Ernis (confirmed Jan. 1, 
1993). 
65. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 9 439B.410 (1987) (failing to define "appropriate ad- 
mission," "medically necessary," "medically fit," "indigent patient," "stabilized," "ad- 
ditional risk," "inadequate time . . . to transfer . . . safely," "threat," "sufficient se- 
verity," "reasonably . . . expected," "serious jeopardy," "serious impairment," "serious 
dysfunction," "sufficiently stabilized," and "acceptable risk"); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§ 2805-b (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992) (failing to define such terms as "need of 
immediate hospitalization," "all convenient speed," "emergency medical care," "stabi- 
lized sufficiently," "best interest," "proper equipment or personnel," "reasonable 
time," and "available and willing to admit"); WYO. STAT. § 35-2-115 (1988) (failing 
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initiatives have been remarkably few. In addition, one can only 
wonder about the quality of reporting procedures that lead t o  
defendants like those in New York, in spite of persistent anec- 
dotal evidence that the relatively more prosperous private insti- 
tutions dump regularly on public facilities. 
111. THE MARKET FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 
A. Pricing Premiums and Assessing Risk 
Physicians and nurses, medical ethicists and philoso- 
phers, economists and political scientists express opinions 
about what care society owes or does not owe ill persons. As 
an aging population combines with advancing medical tech- 
nology, more people will need treatment, and more treatment 
will be available. The question is who will get what and who 
will pay.66 
The market for health insurance, as one might expect, is 
linked closely to  the forces that affect the cost of health care. 
Over the past ten years health care expenditures in the United 
States have risen from approximately $238.9 billion in 1980~' 
to $738 billion in 1991, o r  13% of the Gross National Product 
(GNP)? By the year 2000 it is estimated that 15% of GNP 
will be spent on health care, if current rates of growth 
c~ntinue.~' This cost increase for health care represents a dra- 
to define "emergency service and care," "danger of loss of life," "serious injury or 
illness," "appropriate facilities," "qualified personnel," "ordinary medical care and 
skill," "permanent illness or injury," and "sufficient qualified personnel"). 
66. ARTHUR W. FRANK, AT THE WILL OF THE BODY: REFLECTIONS ON ILLNESS 
115 (1991). 
67. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System, 
326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1715, 1717 Table 2 (1992). 
68. Estimates vary. See Walter A. Costelo, Jr., President's Message, MASS. LAW. 
WKLY., June 8, 1992, at 37 (reporting $738 billion spent on health care in 1991, 
representing 13% of GNP); Ruth SoRelle, 70 Percent of Texans Unhappy with 
Health-Care System; National Plan Backed by One-Third of Those Surveyed in Poll, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 17, 1992, a t  11 (reporting $756 billion spent on health care 
in 1991, accounting for 12.2% of GNP). 
69. See Charles A. Bowsher, Let's Extend Health Care to All Our People, 
NEWSDAY, Apr. 29, 1991, at 33 ("If current trends continue during this decade, the 
United States will be spending 15 percent of its GNP on health care by the turn 
of the century. This growth will add $300 billion per year to national health 
spending in the year 2000."); Uniform Payment Rules, Caps Needed to Cut Costs, 
GAO Tells House, 18 Pension Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 733 (Apr. 22, 1991) (7NIearly 
15% of the United States' gross national product will be spent on health care by 
the year 2000."). Some estimates are even higher. See Statement by Senate Finance 
Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas) on Health Care Reform Bill He Plans 
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matic increase to the consumer of the potential cost of an event 
requiring the care and attention of a medical professional. For 
a consumer who is willing to assume a moderate amount of 
risk, this increase in cost, other things being equal, should 
have led to a decrease in the demand for health insurance. 
In fact, over the past twenty years, the number of individu- 
als with private (non-Medicaid or Medicare) health insurance 
has increased to 158 million.70 Originally, the private insur- 
ance market was dominated almost completely by Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield, a collection of not-for-profit plans.'' Two 
rather remarkable changes have taken place in the market for 
health insurance recently. The first involves the way in which 
premiums are calculated. When Blue Cross was created in 
to Introduce, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 202, a t  L1 (Oct. 18, 1991) 
(health care costs consume 12% of GNP, a percentage projected to increase to 
17.3% by the end of the decade-a trend the President's budget director has de- 
scribed as "unsustainable "); cfi Spencer Rich, Study Finds Rr for U.S. in Canada 
Health Plan: In Decade, Savings Calculated in the Trillions, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 
1991, at  A19 ("[Ilf the current system were to continue in effect and health care 
costs rise to 17.5 percent of gross domestic product by the year 2000 . . . ."). 
70. Employee Benefit Research Inst., Sources of Health Insurance and Charac- 
teristics of the Uninsured, Analysis of the March I991 Current Population Survey, 
EBRI SPECIAL REP. & ISSUE BRIEF NO. 123, Feb. 1992, at  5 Table 1 [hereinaer 
Sources of Health Insurance]. 
71. The first Blue Cross plans were established during the Great Depression in 
cooperation with hospitals. Premiums were based on hospital costs rather than on 
an assessment of individual consumers' risks. Because of the strong tie to hospi- 
tals, Blue Cross was often able to negotiate substantial hospital discounts for sub- 
scribers. The Blues Are Displaying New Hues, NAT'L J., April 18, 1987, at  938. 
In 1939, Blue Shield plans were established, offering similar types of coverage, 
but for doctors' services as opposed to Blue Cross hospital costs. Id. Both Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield plans featured broad coverage and no deductibles or 
copayments. The plans were open to all consumers, regardless of health risks. Both 
plans assessed costs based on "community rating" systems, which meant that ev- 
eryone within a certain geographical area paid the same rate. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield plans were set up according to special state legislation and were afforded 
tax-exempt status. Id. 
The Blues began to face major competition in the 1940s with the advent of 
managed-care plans. Dena Bunis & Michael Unger, Growing Pains: Cost Squeeze 
Spurs an Industry, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1991, at  32. The first managed-care plan to 
challenge the Blues was started in 1942 by California industrialist Henry Kaiser. 
Kaiser Permanente had affiliated hospitals and clinics all along the West Coast. 
Workers contributed five cents a day in exchange for free medical care at affiliates. 
Kaiser's East Coast counterpart, the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York 
(HIP), was begun in 1947 by then New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. HIPS first 
members were city workers and union members. Kaiser and HIP were the forerun- 
ners of today's HMOs. Id. 
This competition had a marked effect on the Blues operation nationwide. After 
World War 11, commercial pressure forced a shift away Gom community rating. 
The Blues Are Displaying New Hues, supra, at  938. 
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1933,~~ premiums were assessed on the basis of a community 
rating.73 That is, premiums were the same for all subscribers 
without regard to the actual experience of the group. However, 
when Blue Cross began t o  experience competition from the for- 
profit sector, it abandoned community rating in favor of expe- 
rience rating-i.e., it began to charge premiums that reflected 
the risk of the insured group. 
This change from community rating to experience rating is 
precisely what one would expect to see in an efficient market 
for health insurance because community rating, while attrac- 
tive in some respects, is ineffi~ient.?~ Any comdunity consists 
of high-risk, high-use consumers and low-risk, low-use consum- 
ers. The effect of community rating by Blue Cross was t o  subsi- 
dize high-use consumers because the rate they paid did not 
accurately reflect the true cost of insuring them. The subsidy, 
of course, was provided by the low-risk subscribers who were 
paying more for insurance than their usage would indicate they 
should. 
Community rating could be defended on equity grounds if 
one could determine that the subsidy toward high-use consum- 
ers was simultaneously a subsidy toward low-income consum- 
' ers. In fact, though, a study of Michigan Blue Cross concluded 
that the groups enjoying the largest subsidies were not those 
with the lowest incomes. As Professor Paul Feldstein has not- 
ed, 'What appears to have occurred-in practice under communi- 
ty rating was that the subsidy-tax concept operated in reverse; 
higher income persons were subsidized by lower-income per- 
son~."'~ 
Besides its disproportionzte equity effects, community 
rating also distorted the health insurance market in that it 
decreased the demand of the low-usehow-risk consumers for 
health insurance. An example may help to illustrate why. 
72. Annette Spence, Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise, Bus. DATELINE, Feb. 1992, at 
16. 
73. Recently, New York mandated a return to community rating for insurers 
who wish to sell small group or individual policies. See Peter Passell, Whut Hidden 
Costs in Spreading the Insurance Risk?, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, $ 4, at 6. 
74. See diagram, infra. 
75. PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 159 (3d ed. 1988). 
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EFFECT OF COMMUNITY RATING ON DEMAND FOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
Price of Ins 
G p = cost (high user) 
F p (community 
rating) 
E p = cost (low user) 
\ Demand 
I Quantity of Health Ins. 
A -> B: increase in purchases of high users at community rating price. 
D -> C: decrease in purchases of low users at community rating price. 
: overall wealth gain for high cost users. 
F.q 
.L.:.~s~..s. : overall wealth loss for low cost users. 
A B,C,D: wealth loss of low cost users that is not transferred to insurance 
company. This is pure deadweight loss. 
E,F,C,B: wealth loss of low cost users transferred to insurers. 
1 1 F,G,H,A: wealth gain of high cost users transferred to them by insurers. 
A A,B,H: wealth gain of high cost users transferred to them by insurers. 
A H,I,B: wealth loss of society that is not transferred to insurers. This is 
pure deadweight loss. 
As the diagram illustrates, a low-risk user's demand for health 
insurance is artificially decreased by a community rating pric- 
ing scheme because the community rating, in effect, acts like a 
tax and discourages additional purchases. This is inefficient in 
the sense that dollars of coverage, which could be profitably 
insured, are not under a community rating plan. The opposite 
is also true. Dollars of coverage that cannot be profitably in- 
sured are covered under community rating. 
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. When the market for traditional health insurance encoun- 
tered competition from the relatively new for-profit sector, 
community rating disappeared quickly since Blue Cross could 
no longer hope to attract, maintain, and overcharge low-use 
consumers. 
The second interesting development in the market for 
health insurance has been the recognition that the longstand- 
ing link between private coverage and employment, which has 
been described as "a~cidental ,"~~ is not necessarily the most 
useful mechanism for ensuring maximum access. An examina- 
tion of the link between employment and private health insur- 
ance is long overdue, especially in light of data which suggest 
that 19.9 million employed individuals are without any form of 
insurance.?? It has never been the case that all employers of- 
fered some form of health coverage as a benefit to 
employees;78 however, as  the cost of coverage has increased, 
more employers, especially smaller ones, have decided to drop 
all coverage.?' In other cases, employers have decreased their 
76. ELI GINZBERG, THE MEDICAL TRIANGLE: PHYSICIANS, POLITICIANS AND THE 
PUBLIC 252 (1990). 
77. EBRI reports that 55.7% of the 35.7 million Americans without health in- 
surance are employed. Sources of Health Insurance, supra note 70, a t  8. 
78. In 1991, employee benefits represented 25.3% of workers' total compensation 
in firms with fewer than 100 workers. This included 5.5% spent on insurance bene- 
fits and 9.7% spent on legally required benefits such as unemployment insurance 
and Social Security. Employee Benefit Research Inst., A Look a t  Compensation 
Costs from the Employer and Employee Perspective, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NOTES, Apr. 
1992, at  1, 2. In firms with 500 or more workers, the benefits represented 30.7% 
of total compensation, including 7.6% spent on insurance benefits and 8.2% spent 
on legally required benefits. Id. 
79. Small businesses offer disproportionately less health insurance coverage 
than their large counterparts. Gannett News Service reports that a 1986 study by 
the Small Business Administration found 44% of the nation's 3.7 million businesses 
did not have health coverage for employees. Businesses with large numbers of 
employees were most likely to offer some coverage. Judith Egerton, Small Busi- 
nesses Losing Grip on Soaring Insurance Costs, Gannett News Service, Apr. 29, 
1990, available in LENS, Nexis library, Gannett File. Business Week reports that "a 
number of small businesses are taking the ultimate step to solve the [health care 
cost] problem. They are simply jettisoning their health insurance plans, leaving 
their employees to fend for themselves." Minor Surgery Won't Help Health Care, 
Brrs. WEEK, Nov. 26, 1990, at  202; see also Sara J. Harty & Adrienne C. Locke, 
End to Cost Shifting May Spur Employers to Offer Health Plans, Bus. INS., April 
22, 1991, a t  3, 14 (quoting Jill Foley, research assistant, EBRI: "As health costs 
continue to increase, we will probably see increased rates of noncoverage for peo- 
ple in small firms."); Robert Pear, Insurers Plan to Fight Congress on Small-Busi- 
ness Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at A26 ("Small employers with 
sick or disabled workers often find it difficult or impossible to get health insurance 
a t  prices they can afford."); Michael Tanner, As Washington Dithers, States Reform 
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premium contribution, pushing the added cost on to employ- 
e e ~ . ~ ~  Either way, many employed individuals cannot obtain 
insurance coverage for themselves and their dependents a t  an 
affordable rate. I t  is not clear how the move from community 
rating to experience rating has affected the size of the working 
uninsured; one would expect, though, that as the cost of premi- 
ums rose for high-use employees to its true level (up from the 
subsidized, community rating level) employers with high-use 
workers would face even greater costs and concomitant incen- 
tives to substitute another lower-cost benefit.81 
B. The Demand for and Supply of Health Insurance 
Total demand for health insurance is determined by sever- 
al factors, including the cost of the insurance, the probability of 
a covered event occurring, the income of the purchaser, the 
expected size of the loss, and the risk aversion of the purchas- 
er.p2 Like other products, health insurance may vary widely in 
Health Care, HERITAGE FOUND. REP. (Nov. 27, 1991) (as a result of increased costs, 
many small businesses reluctantly choose to forego health insurance for their em- 
ployees). 
80. See Ron Pollack, Business Expenses for Health Care Exceed After-Tax Prof- 
its, Report Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 238, at G7 (Dec. 11, 1991) 
("The response by many employers [to increased insurance costs] has been to shift 
more of the burden onto their employees . . . . In fact, . . . employees are now 
paying a larger share of employer-sponsored health insurance, up from 18 percent 
in 1980 to 23 percent in 1991." By the end of this decade, health spending will 
absorb nearly twice as much family income as it did in 1980.). 
81. Charles Klein of John Hancock Financial Services explains: 
As far as recruiting people, a small company will never be able to [offer] 
the same types of benefits a larger organization [does]. I t  may be easier 
to implement, but the cost per employee is too high. Small employers 
need to do other things to attract people. They need to promote the work 
environment and non-qualified type plans . . . . An alternative to the 
fully insured plan is the self-funded plan, in which employers pay the 
cost of premiums into a reserve account, administered by a reinsuring 
company. 
Tim Taylor, T h  High Cost of Health, ARK. BUS., Mar. 2, 1992, $ 1, a t  20. Brenda 
Weeks, owner of Employee Benefit Consultants, Inc. of Little Rock, Arkansas, helps 
small employers find policies that are affordable to them. Options to make policies 
more affordable include not offering maternity riders, opting for different coinsur- 
ance payment levels, and offering in-hospital benefits only. Id. 
Many small employers opt for alternative health insurance plans. For example, 
B&B Industries (Boulder, Colo.) and Applied Technologies, Inc. (Boulder, Colo.) 
have plans which do not cover preventative care. Instead, each employee contrib- 
utes to a company-devised and -run "self-insurance" pool which covers minor medi- 
cal expenses such as office visits. Judy Floyd, Health Insurance Reforms on Hori- 
zon?, BO~JLDEH COUNTY BUS. REP., Mar. 1991, $ 1, a t  1. 
82. For a good discussion of the characteristics of the demand curve for health 
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terms of actual quality and reputation. Even when two policies 
purport to cover the same events under the same circumstances 
and paying the same amount, two companies may have widely 
varying reputations for service (e.g., rapidly processing claims; 
or, in the case of HMOs, quickly providing needed approvals). 
These factors might explain puzzling price differentials in oth- 
erwise identical policies. 
Like other products, the price of health insurance is a 
major determinant of aggregate demand. Indeed, the distor- 
tions created by community rating are of concern because of 
their depressing effect on the demand for insurance by low-risk 
consumers. The flight from community rating, triggered by the 
entrance of for-profit competitors to Blue Cross, is ample proof 
of the central role that price plays in determining demand for 
health insurance. The other determinants depend on 
consumers' subjective assessments of the type of medical servic- 
es, if any, they will require. The income of the consumer is 
important because as income rises, an employee's demand for 
fringe benefits (including health insurance) rises as well.s3 
The supply side of the market appears to be characterized 
by relatively low barriers to entry for numerous firms-both 
nonprofit (the Blues) and for-profit.84 There are currently 
more than 700 for-profit insurerss5 and 73 Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield plans.86 Until 1986, Blue Cross enjoyed a market 
advantage over commercial for-profit insurers in the form of 
federal tax-exempt status. This status was revoked by Congress 
in 1986 because Blue Cross was operating much like a for-prof- 
it organization? Many Blue Cross plans have negotiated sub- 
insurance, see FELDSTEIN, supm note 75, at  76-97. 
83. See, e.g., Mark V. Panly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in 
the Medical Economy, J. ECON. LITERMYIRE, June 24, 1986, at  644. 
84. For some hrther general background on the health care market and discus- 
sions of proposals for reform, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST. M)R RJR. POLICY 
RESEARCH, A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE (Mancur Olson 
ed., 1981); Charles Bruner, SLICING THE HEALTH CARE PIE (1988); IsszJES IN 
HEALTH ECONOMICS (Roice D. Luke & Jeffrey C. Bauer eds., 1982). 
85. BURTON T. Bw, JR. & JOHN J. MCFADDEN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 165 (3d 
ed. 1992). 
86. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS'N, QZJESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE 
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ORGANIZATION 1 (1991). 
87. Blue Cross Blue Shield's tax-exempt status was revoked by Congress in 
1986. See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Hearings Before the Committee on Ways & 
Means, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4510 (testimony of Rep. 
Stark, D-Calif.) ("[Ierhaps the time has come for Blue Cross Blue Shield, which is 
acting very competitive and very much like a profit making business, with tremen- 
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stantial hospital discounts with provider hospitals, and are able 
to pass along some of these savings through lower premiums to 
~ o n s u m e r s . ~ ~  
However, many for-profit commercial insurers and the 
Blues have formed HMOs and PPOs in an attempt to attract 
consumers who are willing to forego complete freedom of pro- 
vider choice in return for lower cost. By the end of 1991, there 
were 550 HMOs in the United StatesOs9 The growth of HMOs 
and PPOs has led many to question the wisdom of the fee-for- 
service method of reimbursement that many insurance compa- 
nies (including Blue Cross) have used. The principal disadvan- 
tage of fee-for-service is that it does nothing to encourage pro- 
viders to contain costs. On the contrary, i t  encourages providers 
to supply more tests and procedures than are medically neces- 
sary in order to maximize income. In  the Medicare context, the 
move away from fee-for-service to DRGs by Congress (described 
in Section 11) was an attempt to avoid this problem and contain 
costs. Unfortunately, providers have incentives to "upcode" 
cases into higher paying DRGs in order to resist attempts to 
limit their income?' 
C. Regulation and Other Market Distortions 
Economists estimate that of the 35.7 million people 
thought to have no health insurance (public or private), 19.9 
million are empl~yed.~' The link between the absence of ade- 
quate insurance and dumping is well e s t ab l i~hed .~~  Congress's 
dously aggressive marketing policies, and providing new products, doing all the 
things free enterprise does except helping to pay my salary."). 
88. See  BE^, JR .  & MCFADDEN, supra note 85, at  169. 
89. GROIJP HEALTH ASS% OF AM., THE NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF HMOs 9 
(1992). 
90. See, e.g., Uwe E .  Reinhardt, Quality: The Achilles Heel of Market Strategy, 
HOSPITALS, Od .  5, 1988, at  24. 
91. See Sources of Health Insurance, supra note 70, at 9 Chart 2. 
92. Judith Waxman, of the National Health Law Program, testified before Con- 
gress that 
[ilt is these uninsured people who are the least desirable to health care 
providers and who, as evidenced by the stories you have heard today, are 
a t  the highest risk of being dumped. A recent study by the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation found that 1 million Americans were denied health 
care because they couldn't pay for it and an additional 14 million did not 
seek care because they could not afford it. 
Equal Access to Health Care, supra note 37, at 40. 
Real-life examples abound. A 1988 congressional report cited the following ex- 
amples from California:- 
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stated goal has been to eliminate dumping of emergency pa- 
tients, and it has tried to do this by making dumping illegal 
and threatening violators with serious penalties. Little or no 
attention has been paid to exploring why so many people can- 
not obtain insurance at any price. 
The pool of uninsured can be divided into those who are 
employed (about 19.9 million) and those who are not. For the 
latter group, the traditional link between employment and 
health insurance no doubt serves as a barrier to finding an  
affordable policy, since the employment-based group normally 
provides the advantage of a larger pool over which the insurer 
can spread risk and charge a lower premium. In addition, the 
advantage of employment status is that many employers, in 
part because of tax  advantage^,^^ will pay a portion of, the 
In Contra Costa County, Eugene Barnes was a crime victim with a 
knife wound to the brain. No neurosurgeon would agree to come to any of 
the East Bay hospitals to treat him. After several hours he was trans- 
ferred to the county hospital in San Francisco, where he died. Mr. Barnes 
had no health insurance. 
About to deliver, Sharon Ford was turned away from two private 
hospitals, although a fetal monitor showed fetal distress. By the time she 
was admitted to the county hospital, it was too late and the baby died. 
Although Ms. Ford was a Medical patient enrolled in a health mainte- 
nance organization, a computer error did not show her on the list. The 
hospitals, by mistake, thought she was uninsured. 
William Jenness bled to death 6 1/2 hours after a car accident in 
Stanislaus County. The private hospital where he was taken asked for a 
$1,000 advance deposit. Because he couldn't pay, he was transferred to 
the county hospital where it took 4 hours before he reached the operating 
room. Mr. J e ~ e s s  was uninsured. 
In labor and uninsured, h a  Grant went to a private hospital. The 
hospital kept her in a wheelchair in their lobby for 2 hours and 15 min- 
utes. She was checked only once, and no tests were done which would 
have shown that the fetus was in profound distress. She was told to "get 
herself" to the county hospital. The transferring hospital misrepresented 
her condition to the county hospital via phone. The baby was later still- 
born at the county hospital, where doctors spent 40 minutes in an at- 
tempted resuscitation. 
H.R. REP. NO. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988); see also Burditt v. United 
States Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 934 F.2d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1991) (Mrs. 
Rosa Rivera, in labor, was transferred to another hospital despite hypertensive 
complications. The baby was born en route to the transferee hospital.). 
93. "Contributions by an employer to accident and health . . . benefits (through 
insurance or otherwise) for employees, or payments such as those for medical care 
or permanent injury in reasonable amounts, are deductible business expenses. They 
result in a business benefit in the form of improvement of employee morale." 1992- 
2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 41 8702.015, a t  22,087 (CCH explanation, Temp. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10T). Section 1.162-10 provides: "Amounts paid within the tax- 
able year for dismissal wages, unemployment benefits, guaranteed annual wages, 
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group premium for each employee. Thus, when analyzing how 
to create incentives for insurers to deal with the uninsured, it 
is important to distinguish among the pool on the basis of em- 
ployment status. The presence of an intermediate employer af- 
fects the insurer's ability to spread costs, and the quantity of 
health insurance demanded at any price may be higher for the 
employed consumer than for an individual who is unemployed. 
Congress has focused, via COBRA and the Hill-Burton 
program, on the provision of medical services without examin- 
ing why so many consumers cannot obtain the coverage that 
would eliminate provider reluctance to offer all covered servic- 
es, emergency or otherwise. The failure to focus on the health 
insurance market as part of the dumping problem may stem 
from the fact that at least some of the uninsured remain uncov- 
ered precisely because of other well-intentioned, but ill-con- 
ceived, regulations not unlike COBRA itself. The point is that 
some of the regulations that health insurers confront as they 
attempt to  do business in any of the state marketsg4 discour- 
age the provision of low-cost policies to the uninsured. 
1. Dictating the terms of the health insurance contract 
The insurance or hospital sections of many state codes 
detail regulations for private insurance contracts that are both 
surprising and disturbing. In Massachusetts, for example, 
health insurers of groups or individuals are required to cover, 
vacations, or a sickness, accident, hospitalization, medical expense, recreational, 
welfare, or similar benefit plan, are deductible under section 162(a) if they are 
ordinary and necessary expenses of the trade or business." Treas. Reg. 8 1.162-10 
(1958). 
94. For example, insurers in California face numerous regulations regarding re- 
quired contract provisions. Policies issued to families must provide for the addition 
of new members and adopted minor children and provide extension coverage for 
termination. CAL. INS. CODE, 8 11512.1 (West 1988). Insurers offering coverage for 
sterilization cannot limit coverage based on the reason for sterilization. Id. Con- 
tracts which offer mastectomy coverage must also include coverage for prosthetic 
devices or reconstructive surgery, and for mammography. Id. 8 11512.10. Insurers 
must offer coverage for treatment of alcoholism. Id. 8 11512.14. Insurers must also 
offer coverage for treatment in an extended care facility. Id. 8 11512.16. Further- 
more, coverage must be offered for orthotic and prosthetic devices. Id. $ 11512.175. 
If long-term or home-based care coverage is offered, it cannot exclude persons hav- 
ing Alzheimer's or related dementing illnesses. Id. 8 11512.177. In plans offering 
maternity coverage, coverage for prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders must be 
offered. Id. 8 11512.18. Additionally, coverage must be offered for diabetic daycare 
self-management education programs. Id. 8 11512.23. Insurers must also offer cov- 
erage for mental or nervous disorders. Id. 8 11512.5. 
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inter alia: adopted children, in-vitro and fertility procedures, 
mental illness, prenatal care, mammograms, handicapped chil- 
dren, and home health care.95 In New York, group and indi- 
vidual policies must provide coverage for preadmission testing, 
second surgical opinions, and maternity care among other 
things.g6 In Texas, insurers of group and individual policies 
must provide coverage for in-vitro fertilization, in addition to 
the list of other items.g7 Moreover, some states now forbid in- 
surers from inquiring about the HIV status of prospective con- 
sumers, on the grounds that this information encourages in- 
surers to overcharge or avoid altogether persons suspected of 
carrying the HIV virus.98 
As one observer has noted, "There are now some 900 such 
mandates nationwide, the most frequent among them being 
those for alcoholism treatment (required in 42 states), mam- 
mography screening (41 states), mental health care (32 states), 
and drug abuse treatment (31 states)."99 
These kinds of regulations raise two issues: whether it is 
desirable to have the state dictate the terms of the insurance 
contract; and what the effect is of precluding insurers from 
gathering information about whether prospective consumers 
are likely to be high- or low-users of health care. With respect 
to the first issue, the obvious problem raised by requiring in- 
95. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 110 (West 1987). In 1985 an insurance 
company challenged section 47B of Massachusetts's insurance code provision, which 
required insurers to include certain minimum mental health benefits in an 
individual's general health insurance policy or an employee health care plan that 
covered hospital and surgical expenses. The U.S. Supreme Court (reviewing a deci- 
sion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court) determined that these mandat-. 
ed benefits were not preempted by either ERISA or the National Labor Relations 
Act. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
96. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 ( M c K i ~ e y  1985). 
97. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6, $ 3A (West Supp. 1992). 
98. Various states regulate the use of HIV testing for insurance purposes. In 
Florida, for example, the Omnibus AIDS Act restricts the use of HIV-related tests 
by insurance companies, allowing testing only when based on the patient's current 
medical condition or history or when it is triggered by coverage amounts. Robert C. 
Waters, Florida Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 493 
(1989). 
Benjamin Schatz, of National Gay Rights Advocates in San Francisco, explains 
that the primary argument against HIV testing for insurance purposes is one of 
social policy. Therefore, the main focus of industry opponents is the perceived so- 
cial cost of allowing insurance companies to use the test. Benjamin Schatz, TJZQ 
AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1782, 
1793 (1987). 
99. Iglehart, supra note 67, at  1719. 
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surers to provide, for example, maternity benefits, is that not 
all subscribers would expect to take advantage of such cover- 
age. Single males would have little or no interest in pregnancy- 
related coverage. Likewise, couples without children are not 
likely to find mandated orthodontic coverage terribly helpful in 
most instances. And, of course, many people would not expect 
to make use of fertility treatments, and coverage for prosthetic 
devices, alcoholism, or drug addiction. loo 
The point is that when the state insists on certain contrac- 
tual provisions, the parties lose the ability t o  fashion a flexible 
contract that meets the needs of the particular individual or 
group in question. This is of particular concern in the health 
care arena, where access to coverage is clearly not optimal. 
Mandated coverage raises the insurer's cost of doing business 
(and therefore the cost of insurance), without any necessary 
corresponding increase in the satisfaction or security of the 
insured. 
Take, for example, a single male who, in considering 
whether to purchase a policy, must purchase one that covers 
pregnancy-related expenses, orthodontia, breast reconstruction, 
and the costs of the drug AZT to combat HIV infection. Even if 
we assume this man is moderately risk averse, it is not hard to 
imagine many single men who would value these benefits at, or 
near, zero. The potential consumer, though, has no choice, since 
he is not free to bargain with the insurer over the terms for 
coverage. On the contrary, he is faced with accepting coverage 
more extensive (and therefore more expensive) than he desires, 
or foregoing coverage altogether. 
Single men, of course, are not the only ones who may find 
themselves in this predicament. A married couple with chil- 
dren, too, may find some of the mandated coverage items virtu- 
ally useless. The couple may believe that HIV infection and 
related expenses like AZT, for example, are not contingencies 
they wish to insure against. On the other hand, maternity 
100. California requires insurers of group and individual policies to cover pros- 
thetic devices. CAL. INS. CODE § 11512.175 (Deering Supp. 1993). In addition, both 
Texas and Michigan require coverage for chemical dependency. See TEX. INS. CODE 
ANN. art. 3.51-9, $ 2A(a) (West Supp. 1993) ("Insurers . . . shall provide, directly 
or by contract with other entities . . . benefits for the necessary care and treat- 
ment of chemical dependency that are not less favorable than for physical illness 
generally . . . ." 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 500.3425(1) West 1983) ("Each in- 
surer offering health policies in this state shall provide coverage for intermediate 
and outpatient care for substance abuse . . . ."). 
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coverage may be of great interest. The rigid requirements of 
the state that undertakes to draft the contract for health insur- 
ance interferes with the ability of people t o  negotiate for cover- 
age that best suits their needs. At the same time, excess cover- 
age for events that are unlikely to occur simply adds to the 
premium cost of the insurance without conferring any addition- 
al benefits in many cases. For this reason, mandated coverage 
provisions are inefficient. 
The second, and more recent, way in which states interfere 
with the market for health insurance is by forbiddmg insurers 
from gathering certain kinds of information about the likely 
demand of various consumers for health care. Statutes prohib- 
iting testing for andjnquiring about HIV status are clear ex- 
amples of this.''' The purpose of these rules is, ostensibly, to 
prohibit discrimination against those who are infected. The ef- 
fect, however, of prohibiting testing and other procedures de- 
signed to  determine whether a prospective consumer is infect- 
ed, is to encourage insurers to use covert proxies to reach the 
same, albeit less accurate, result. There is now evidence of 
101. Many insurers now require individuals and people insured through small 
group policies to take an HIV test for health or disability coverage. For example, 
Mutual of Omaha (the largest national underwriter of individual health insurance 
policies) requires an HIV test for both health and disability insurance. Northwest- 
ern Mutual Life requires full blood profiles for individuals applying for disability 
insurance. Travellers Insurance requires HIV tests, blood profiles, and urinalysis 
for applicants seeking small group health plans. Debra Beachy, Screened Out of 
Health Insurance; Coverage Denied, HOCJSTON CHRON., May 3, 1992, at 1. Farmers 
Insurance in Seattle requires individuals seeking $50,000 or more in life insurance 
coverage to have an HIV test. Shelby Gilje, H N  and Insurance-Will Companies 
Require Applicants to Be Tested for the AIDS Virus?, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 12, 
1991, at  C1. Prudential Insurance and Blue Cross/Blue Shield do not require HIV 
tests for health or disability policies. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, however, does require 
consumers to fill out a questionnaire about whether they have AIDS, the HIV 
virus, or any other illnesses. Beachy, supra. 
A number of states have regulations regarding insurers' ability to test for HIV. 
A few examples: In Washington state, insurers are allowed to test for HIV as long 
as testing is done on a nondiscriminatory basis. Gilje, supra. Under current Mis- 
souri law, insurers are allowed to require HIV testing before considering policy 
applications. Arlene Zarembka, HW: Insurance, Employment and Mandatory Testing 
Issues, 53 Mo. L. REV. 679, 680 (1988). In the District of Columbia, insurers can- 
not deny, cancel, or refuse to renew policies based on positive HIV results; howev- 
er, insurers can refuse coverage to applicants diagnosed with AIDS. Insurers can- 
not mandate testing for HIV. S u z a ~ e  J. Smutton, Comment, Lef? of Center and 
Right in Front of Us: AIDS Testing in Insurance ITnderwriting-Th Social and 
Economic Implications of This Practice on Individuals and Society, 17 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 273, 285-86 (1988). In New York, efforts to stop companies from testing for 
HIV have failed. Jeanne D. Cooper, AIDS Insurance Screening: Practice Widespread, 
But Criticized by Activists, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1991, at  3. 
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widespread efforts by insurers to use proxies like zip codes, 
occupation, and marital status to avoid insuring gay men who 
are thought to be at high risk for HIV infection.'" 
The essential problem is that whether an individual is 
likely to be a high- or low-use consumer of health care makes a 
tremendous difference to the insurer in a market that relies on 
experience rating to determine prices. When the state attempts 
to keep critical information from an insurer, one would expect 
to see efforts to gather that same information in more circu- 
itous, expensive, and less accurate ways. 
Both mandated terms of coverage and attempts to rid the 
market of discrimination have the effect of introducing a mea- 
sure of irrationality and inefficiency into the market for health 
insurance. These regulatory efforts raise costs directly by forc- 
ing consumers to purchase contracts for coverage that are 
broader than the consumer deems desirable, and indirectly by 
forcing insurers to expend resources to gather prohibited in- 
formation circuitously. The onerous nature of state regulatory 
efforts in this area is further evidenced by the recent trend 
toward self-insurance. As Professor Iglehart argues, self-in- 
sured companies "are exempt from providing the various medi- 
cal benefits that must be included in private health insurance 
plans according to the mandate of state  legislature^."'^^ 
Given the general consensus that access to health care is 
a t  a suboptimal level, regulations which raise costs and de- 
102. These measures are used by insurers to determine which applicants to test 
for HIV. Underwriters use factors such as race, residence, occupation, and marital 
status to determine who to test. Zarernbka, supra note 101, at 686. In addition, 
some insurance companies have denied coverage to single men who live in certain 
zip codes or who work in professions thought to be dominated by gay men, such as 
hairdressing. Sarah Henry, Health Insurance Caps: Redlining People With AIDS, 
NATION, Nov. 11, 1991, at 582. 
Benjamin Schatz, director of the AIDS Civil Rights Project of the National Gay 
Rights Advocates in San Francisco, launched a successhl challenge to underwriting 
guidelines developed by Munich American Reinsurance Company of Atlanta. Accord- 
ing to Schatz, the guidelines "were designed by the company to 'weed out' gay men 
and deny them coverage." John Heilman, AIDS Discrimination, L.A. LAW., June 
1986, at  26, 30-31. The guidelines classified as high risk those men between the 
ages of 20 and 50 who lived in cities with large gay populations and who had 
"illicit lifestyles" or named as a beneficiary someone other than a spouse or child. 
Id. at 31. A similar action was filed against the Great Republic Life Insurance Co. 
of Santa Barbara, whose guidelines, according to Schatz, segregated applications 
from those in occupations not requiring physical exertion such as antique dealer, 
florist, interior designer, and restaurant, jewelry, and fashion industry employees. 
Id. 
103. See Iglehart, supra note 67, at  1719. 
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crease access to insurance cry out for review. 
2. Other distortions 
Lest the reader be left with the false impression that all 
the forces which raise the cost of health insurance are external, 
several other anticompetitive practices that tend to raise the 
cost of medical care itself (and therefore the cost of insurance) 
deserve brief mention. These practices are licensure require- 
ments, staff privileges, and peer review. 
I consider licensure first because it raises the most funda- 
mental questions about the desirability of competition in the 
market for health care. Professional licensure has been de- 
scribed as "edicts that individuals may not engage in particular 
economic activities except under conditions laid down by a 
constituted authority of the state."lo4 In health care this 
means that only duly licensed physicians may practice in the 
various medical specialties, and that nurses' functions are lim- 
ited to the terms of their license.lo5s and other providers, and 
that licensure is the only mechanism by which quality can be 
guaranteed. To the extent that licensing requirements have 
little to do with technical competence, this- argument obviously 
loses force. 
As Professor Reinhardt has noted, health-care providers 
who claim to favor increased competition really only mean to 
eliminat[e] . . . whatever government regulation . . . [they] 
find.burdensome . . . . [Tlhe advocates of deregulation in med- 
icine do not invariably favor a wholesale retreat of govern- 
ment regulators. Is one to assume, for example, that physi- 
cians and dentists who now celebrate the impending deregula- 
tion of medicine are implicitly advocating the abolition of 
104. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 138 (1962). 
105. So many states license such a wide variety of professional activities that i t  
is impossible to list them all. However, a sampling may be helphl. 
In New York, one must have a license to work as a barber or beautician, N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW $ 432 (1984), a taxi driver, N.Y. TOWN LAW $ 136(1) (1987), a 
nurse, N.Y. Emrc. LAW 4 6906 (1985), a physician, id. $ 6522, an accountant id. 
9 7402, a dentist, id. $ 6602, a chiropractor id. $ 6552, and a real estate broker, 
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW $ 440(a) (1989). 
In California, accountants, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE $ 5050 (West 1990), ar- 
chitects, id. $ 5536, and veterinarians, id. $ 4825, are licensed. Illinois requires 
licensing for the activities of veterinarians, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, $ 6902 (Smith- 
Hurd 1978), kennel operators, id. ch. 8, $ 303, and podiatrists, id. ch. 111, $ 4901. 
In Texas, licenses are required for such professions as physical therapists, TEX. 
@-&-f!.,,fjTAT. ANN. art. 4512(e), $ 7(a) mes t  1976), hneral directors, id. art. 
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mandatory professional licensure? Would they actually favor 
letting pediatric nurse practitioners and dental hygienists 
practice independent entrepreneurship and compete head-on 
with physicians and dentists?lo6 
The abolition of licensure would undoubtedly enable some 
consumers to lower their health care costs by selecting an unli- 
censed caregiver. And, the increased competition would also 
force at least some of those currently protected by a license to 
compete for patients' business by lowering fees. Whether it  
would also lead to an increase in the amount of quackery and 
claims for negligence and fraud would depend upon the ability 
of consumers to gather and process relevant information about 
practitioners' quality. These concerns, though, probably would 
not outweigh the advantages to consumers generated by the 
abolition of medical licensure. A simple certification process 
would dramatically improve access, while still enabling con- 
sumers to figure out who has adequate mechcal training. 
Concerns about quality notwithstanding, the economic 
interests of licensed medical practitioners are perhaps most 
evident in the areas of staff privileges and peer review where 
numerous antitrust cases demonstrate the tendency of physi- 
cians in particular to go to great lengths to eliminate competi- 
tors. The history of obstetricians and their quest to eliminate 
midwives from this segment of the medical profession is well 
known,lo7 and does not require recitation here. Suffice it to 
say that Professor Enthoven's observation that the "medical 
profession has traditionally opposed economic competition in 
health care services"10g and that. physicians are "ambiva- 
lent"109 about competition is probably understated. 
As several antitrust cases demonstrate, physicians have 
attempted to deny or rescind the staff privileges of doctors 
whose competition for patients was resented;"' embark upon 
106. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Table Manners at the Health Care Feast, in FINANCING 
HEALTH CARE: COMPETITION VS. REGULATION 13, 14 (Duncan Laggy & William G.  
Anlyan eds., 1982). 
107. For an excellent discussion of the decline of midwifery, see DEBORAH A. 
SULLIVAN & ROSE  WE^, LABOR PAINS: MODERN MIDWIVES AND HOME BIRTH 
(1988) (describing the largely successful efforts of the medical establishment to 
eliminate the profession of midwifery). 
108. Alain C. Enthoven, How Interested Groups Have Responded to a Proposal 
for Economic Competition in Health Services, 70 J. AM. ECON. ASSOC. 142, 146 
(1980). 
109. Id. 
110. Eg.,  Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), reu'd, 486 U.S. 94 
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campaigns designed effectively to boycott providers of certain 
kinds of medical services;"' and, under the guise of concern 
over medical standards, encourage official harassment of clinics 
providing low-cost abortion  service^."^ Especially in markets 
with few hospitals, physicians already on staff are sometimes 
tempted, in deciding whether to grant privileges, to focus on 
the economic threat posed by a n  additional competitor. And, as 
Professor Havighurst has explained, as hospitals assert their 
interests in controlling costs (which they must do as a result of 
increased competitiveness engendered by both public and pri- 
vate insurers) they find themselves increasingly a t  odds with 
staff physicians over admitting privileges. "Because a hospital 
can significantly influence physician behavior only by its per- 
ceived readiness to exercise its right to withhold or condition 
admitting privileges, an increase in the number of disputes 
over such privileges is likely to be a   on sequence."^^^ 
Peer review, which has been defined as the "oversight of 
the practices of an individual doctor by fellow profession- 
a l ~ , " " ~  likewise presents opportunities for abuse premised on 
a desire to exclude competitors. At the same time, properly 
applied, peer review may enhance the services received by 
consumers of health care. Peer review is defended as a mecha- 
nism for maintaining practice standards and controlling costs. 
(1988); Maresse v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 
U.S. 1027 (1985); Tambone v. Memorial Hosp., 635 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1986), 
afd, 825 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987); Straube v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 
600 P.2d 381 (Or. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980). 
111. See, e.g., Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990) (holding that A M .  had engaged in illegal restraint of 
trade when it enacted Medical Ethics Principle 3, which prohibited medical physi- 
cians from associating professionally with "unscientific practitioners"; deemed chiro- 
practors "unscientific practitioners"; and advised members it was unethical to asso- 
ciate with chiropractors). 
112. Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (holding that medical review organizations 
are not public regulatory bodies for purposes of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
113. Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors a d  Hospitals: An Anti-Trust Perspective on 
Traditional Relationships, 1984 DLJKE L.J. 1071, 1075-76 (footnote omitted); see also 
Philip C. Kissam et. al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional 
Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595, 597 (1982) (arguing that a "set of relatively clear 
antitrust rules could be recognized that would guard against blatant 
anticompetitive abuses without disrupting the legitimate interests of hospitals and 
medical staffs in providing efficient and high quality medical care"). 
114. Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (1986). For a review of the history of peer re- 
view, see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Re- 
view, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 7, 10-14. 
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However, it clearly presents opportunities for anticompetitive 
behavior. In Patrick v. Burget, for example, a physician whose 
relationship with other doctors a t  a competing clinic had deteri- 
orated argued that the peer review process was manipulated by 
his peers to terminate his hospital admitting privileges.ll5 
The point is not that there is no legitimate role for licen- 
sure, controlling staff privileges, and peer review, but that each 
of these practices can be abused to reduce competitive pressure, 
thus raising health care costs and the cost of ins~rance."~ In- 
surance premiums may be higher than they ought to be be- 
cause of external factors such as state-mandated contractual 
terms and because of the internal, anticompetitive practices of 
health care providers. Any serious attempt to make private 
health insurance more widely available will have to address 
the practices which tend to protect and enhance the income of 
providers while providing only dubious assurances of quality to 
consumers. 
IV. DUMPING CANNOT BE REGULATED OUT OF EXISTENCE- 
IN DEFENSE OF A MARKET APPROACH 
A. The Dumping Narratives 
For ye have the poor always with you . . . .I1? 
The ultimate value of illness is that  it teaches us  th,e value of 
being alive; this is why the ill are not just charity cases, but  a 
presence to be valued."* 
In recent years, the power of personal narratives has been 
amply demonstrated by the work of feminist legal scholars and 
others.llg I t  is well known that legal and economic argu- 
115. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 
(1988). 
116. For a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of competition in the health 
care market, see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's 
Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What t k  Doctor Should Order?, 34 
VANI). L. REV. 849 (1981). 
117. Matthew 26:ll (King James). 
118. FRANK, supra note 66, a t  120. 
119. For example, Patricia Williams writes: 
I remember with great clarity the moment I discovered that I was "col- 
ored." I was three. I already knew that I was a "negro"; my parents had 
told me to be proud of that. But "colored" was something else; it  was the 
totemic evil I had heard my little white friends talking about for several 
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ments, however technical, coherent, or persuasive, tend to lose 
sight of the individuals affected?' Moreover, i t  is a very real 
weeks before I realized that I was one of them. I still remember the 
crash of that devastating moment of union, the union of my joyful body 
and the terrible power-life of that devouring symbol of negritude. I have 
spent the rest of my life recovering from the degradation of being divided 
against myself, within myself; I am still trying to overcome the polarity 
of my own vulnerability. The tense poised trembling whirling joy of my 
mortality. The immortal unrelenting finality of my dangerous bottomless 
black fate. 
Patricia Williams, The Obl~ging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Oppor- 
tunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2140 (1989). 
Marie Ashe writes: 
At 7:10 I felt a change. The grinding and tearing pain abated. The nurse 
shouted to someone, she's ten centimeters dilated. The doctor left the 
nursing area. I felt a sensation of incredible pressure, without pain, and a 
headiness. The nurse wheeled my labor room bed through a short hall- 
way, through the double doors of the delivery room. She positioned it 
alongside a narrow table. Climb across, she said. I felt utter astonish- 
ment. She spoke matter-of-factly. Did it happen that other women were 
able, at  this stage of their labors, to climb with agility from one table to 
another? I don't think I can do it alone, I told her. She helped me across. 
Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" 
and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355, 359 (1989). 
In her article Rape, Susan Estrich writes: 
Eleven years ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat and said: "Push 
over, shut up, or I'll kill you." I did what he said, but I couldn't stop 
crying. A hundred years later, I jumped out of my car as he drove away. 
I ended up in the back seat of a police car. I told the two officers I had 
been raped by a man who came up to the car door as I was getting out 
in my own parking lot (and trying to balance the two bags of groceries 
and kick the car door open). He took the car, too. 
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 1087 (1986). 
Martha Mahoney brings to life the words of a battered woman: 
He beat me up on our wedding night. I wound up with a black eye, a 
very bad black eye, and a split lip. He was almost arrested that 
night . . . . I ran out of the house in my nightgown and flagged down a 
passing car and got them to take me to my father-in-law's house. When 
my father-in-law got back, the neighbors had called the police and the 
police were there. My father-in-law talked them out of taking him in. 
Martha R. Mahoney, k g a l  Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separatron, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991). 
120. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica- 
tion, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1777 (1976) ("Nonetheless, I believe that there is 
value as well as an element of real nobility in the judicial decision to throw out, 
every time the opportunity arises, consumer contracts designed to perpetuate the 
exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit. Real people are involved, even 
if there are not very many whose lives the decision can affect."); Alfred S. 
Konefsky & John H. Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American 
Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833, 841 (1982) ("In omitting any mention of the 
outer world impinging on their private island, law school historians are simply 
replicating what goes on in most law schools-the treating of law as an autono- 
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hazard for anyone writing about a problem like patient dump- 
ing. Indeed, law and economics as an approach to examining 
legal problems has received more than its fair share of criticism 
for focusing on allocative efficiency and not distributive justice, 
and for worrying more about competitive markets than about 
people.12' The final section of the article anticipates criticisms 
along these lines, and makes the case for the centrality of eco- 
mous and apolitical ordering. Intellectual movements, large-scale political events, 
debates on social issues, theoretical musings, and ideology warrant no mention in a 
law school history for they apparently have no signxicant influence on the teaching 
of law at  most schools."); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
96 HAW. L. REV. 561, 655 (1983) ("The most obvious conclusion about ideological 
controversy to be drawn from the work of the critical legal studies movement . . . 
is our attack upon the validity of the tacit identification of abstract institutional 
endeavors, like democracy or the market, with the concrete institutional forms that 
these endeavors happen to take in the contemporary world. We have taught our- 
selves not to see the major governmental and economic systems that now compete 
for world mastery as the exhaustive options among which mankind must choose."); 
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSTVE CRITIQUE 13, 21 (David Kairys ed., 1990) ("[Tlhe realists 
urged judges to eschew the rigid, abstract formalism of constitutionally protected 
property and contract rights . . . . Meanwhile, in private law, enlightened, progres- 
sive judges should be willing to sacrifice rigid adherence to the logic of doctrine for 
the sake of doing a more commonsense and overtly policy-oriented 'justice' within 
the particular context of each case."). 
121. See, eg., Unger, supra note 122, at  574-75 (The chief instrument of the 
law and economics school is the equivocal use of the market concept. These ana- 
lysts give free reign to the very mistake that the increasing formalization of 
microeconomics was largely meant to avoid: the identification of the abstract mar- 
ket idea or the abstract circumstance of maximizing choice with a particular social 
and institutional complex . . . . Such are the sophistries by which the law and 
economics school pretends to discover both the real basis for the overall evolution 
of the legal order and the relevant standard by which to criticize occasional depar- 
tures of that order from its alleged vocation."); Jeremy Miller, Economic Analysis of 
Legal Method and Law: The Danger in Valueless and Values, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 
425, 448 (1985) ("The problem with Posneis economic analysis is that it omits the 
subjective 'content' quality of law. Although, as stated and restated, he admits that 
benefits can include some other values, nevertheless, putting a dollar and cents 
cost on something like 'truth,' or 'fairness,' is science gone sour . . . . Human ethi- 
cal-legal values must be present in any just society. They cannot be discarded 
simply because they might appear at that moment to be impractical (inefficient)."); 
Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
905, 905-06 (1980) ("It was 'science' that gave the cloak of legitimacy to the 
Posnerian school's ability resolutely to ignore the question of Distribution for so 
long . . . . It was one thing to be agnostic about the initial Distribution of Wealth, 
as modern economic theorists purported to be. It was still another thing to propose 
or defend changes in common law rules without taking responsibility for the re- 
sulting distributional changes. In law, it was impossible to be indifferent about the 
distributional consequences of common law rules. It was only a matter of time 
before this systematic bias of Chicago law-and-economics favoring the status quo 
became obvious."). 
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nomic analysis in solving even intensely human problems like 
illness and inadequate access to health care. 
First, a comment about the immense suffering and danger 
dumped patients experience. The most striking and highly 
publicized recent example of egregious dumping took place in 
1986 at a private hospital in Victoria, Texas. The case is re- 
markable not only because of the extraordinarily high risk of 
harm t o  which the responsible physician exposed the patient 
and her unborn child, but also because i t  represents a rare 
instance in which responsible authorities decided to  pursue a 
claim under COBRA. In December of that year, Mrs. Rosa 
Rivera arrived at the emergency room of DeTar Hospital in 
labor. She was examined by nurses who found her t o  have 
"dangerously high blood pressure."'" She had no prenatal 
care and was without any form of health insurance. Because 
she was an "unaligned" patient, the nurses contacted Dr. 
Burditt who was next on DeTar's list of rotating, on-call obste- 
tricians. As soon as Burditt was told of Rivera's situation, he 
told the nurses he did not wish to care for her and ordered 
them to  arrange for her transfer to  a public hospital 170 miles 
distant. Dr. Burditt was then told by the nursing supervisor 
that under federal regulations he would at  least have to exam- 
ine Rivera before she could be transferred. Burditt &d examine 
her and found her blood pressure to be "the highest he had 
ever seen."lu High blood pressure can create complications 
during delivery that can kill either the mother or the baby or 
both. After examining Rivera, Burditt signed a "Physician's 
Certificate Authorizing Transfer" without listing any reasons 
and remarked that "until DeTar Hospital pays my malpractice 
insurance, I will pick and choose those patients that I want to 
treat."lZ4 
About two hours later an ambulance finally arrived and 
Rivera left the hospital accompanied by an obstetrical nurse. 
Burditt never examined her again, nor did he order any med- 
ication or life support equipment for her during the transfer. 
About 40 miles into the trip Rivera gave birth to a healthy 
baby. The nurse called Dr. Burditt who ordered them to contin- 
ue onto the public hospital, but Rivera wished to return to  
122. Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Sew., 934 F.2d 1362, 
1366 (5th Cir. 1991). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1367. 
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DeTar, so they did. Dr. Burditt refused to see Rivera when she 
returned to the hospital because she had disobeyed h s  order to 
transfer. Rivera was cared for by another physician and she 
and her baby left in good health three days later. 
The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir- 
cuit describes Burditt's complete indifference to Rivera's (and 
her child's) well-being and his pro-forma "certification": 
The AW properly disregarded Burditt's self-serving, after-the- 
fact justification for transferring Rivera-that DeTar lacked 
facilities to care for Rivera's underweight infant. The record 
shows that upon hearing of Rivera's condition over the tele- 
phone, Burditt made an immediate and unwavering decision 
to transfer her without weighing the medical risks and bene- 
fits of transfer. Because he signed her transfer certification a s  
a mere formality, i t  lacks legal effect as  a certification. 
Every reasonable adult, let alone physician, understands that  
labor evolves to delivery, that  high blood pressure is danger- 
ous, and that the desirability of transferring a patient with 
these conditions could well change over a two-hour period. 
Burditt's indifference to Rivera's condition for the two hours 
after he conducted his single examination demonstrates not 
that  he unreasonably weighed the medical risks and benefits 
of transfer, but that he never made such a judgment. DAB'S 
[the Departmental Appeals Board within HHS] statement 
that  Burditt certified "under circumstances where no reason- 
able [obstetrician] would have certified means only that  the 
facts of this case show certification to be so unacceptable that  
i t  is unlikely that  Burditt actually made the required certifi- 
cation 
The truth is that Burditt is surprising in that no long-term 
physical harm resulted to either Rivera or her child. (The opin- 
ion and the motion papers, briefs, and other litigation materi- 
als are silent about Rivera's pain and suffering during the two 
hours in which she waited to be t ran~ferred.) '~~ Many dump- 
ing victims are not so lucky.127 
125. Id. at 1371-72. 
126. A complete set of briefs, including those of amici curiae, and papers filed 
during the proceedings before HHS, are on file with the author. 
127. The most comprehensive statistical study of dumping that I have been able 
to find was made of 467 patients who were transferred from various hospitals to 
Cook County Hospital in Chicago. See Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public 
Hospital, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986). The study came to some very inter- 
esting conclusions: 89% of those transferred were black or Hispanic; 87% were 
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Although many dumping cases involve pregnant wom- 
en,'% many do not. Indeed, an increasing amount of dumping 
cases involve patients who have insurance, albeit inadequate 
coverage. Recent reports have documented the dumping of 
cancer patients in mid-treatment whose coverage has run 
out,'" and the dumping of AIDS patients.'30 In addition, 
there are those whose inadequate insurance coverage makes 
access to care virtually impossible. The New York Times recent- 
ly described the plight of a single working mother in New York 
who 
live[s] so close to the financial edge that [she] cannot afford to 
go to the doctor, even though she has health insurance. Under 
the rules of her policy, she must have a t  least $100 in charges 
to file a claim, but she cannot afford to pay the money out of 
pocket and wait t o  be reimbursed.13' 
Even health care workers-who surely know the perils of 
going without insurance-frequently do not have insurance. A 
recent study in the Journal of the American Medical Associa- 
tion concluded that "[s]ubstantial numbers of health care work- 
, 
ers lack health i n s ~ r a n c e . " ' ~ ~ n  particular, the low-wage seg- 
transferred because of inadequate medical insurance; only 6% of patients gave 
consent for transfer; 9.4% of transferees died, as opposed to a 3.8% death rate for 
nontransferred patients. Id. at  553-54. 
There are several other good sources for additional dumping examples. George 
J. iknnas, Your MOW or Your Life: "Dumping" Uninsured Patients from Hospital 
Emergency Wards, 76 AM. J. RJB. HEALTH 74 (1986); Howard S. Berliner, Patient 
Dumping-No O m  Wins and We All Lose, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1279 (1988); 
Geraldine Dallek & Judith Waxman, "Patient Dumping": A Crisis in Emergency 
Medical Care for the Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE R V. 1413 (1986); David U. 
Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social Triage, 74 AM. J. 
RIB. HEALTH 494 (1984); William G. Reed et al., Special Report: The Effect of a 
Public Hospital's Transfer Policy on Patient Care, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1428 
(1986). 
128. See, e.g., Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va. 1992) 
(baby born with cerebral palsy and brain damage after delivery following transfer), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 442 (1992); Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 
F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (pregnant teen transferred to same public hospital 
in Texas as Rivera); Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(premature infant dies five hours aRer delivery following transfer). 
129. See, eg., Allan Parachini, Health View: "Dumping" Patients in Critical Care, 
L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1987, $ 5, at  1. 
130. See Joseph Reiner, Comment, AIDS Discrimination by Medical Care Provid- 
ers: Is Washington Law an Adequate Remedy?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 701, 708 (1988). 
131. Celia W. Dugger, Their Wages h w ,  Single Mothers Get Little Help, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at Al. 
132. David U. Himmelstein, Who Cares for the Care Givers? Lack of Health 
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ments of the health care field, such as nursing home workers, 
are frequently uninsured. This "lack of coverage parallels the 
inferior compensation and low status accorded many in the 
field of long-term care."ls3 
Finally, even the access of those covered by Medicaid is 
problematic, as low fees discourage many doctors from partici- 
pating in the program and increase the incentive of private 
hospitals to send these patients to a public facility in the event 
of an emergency? This means that the figures which pur- 
port to assess the size of the uninsured pool probably under- 
state its true size. 
This short recitation of the stories of a few dumping vic- 
tims is meant to illustrate the tragic aspects of this issue in a 
way that statistics and descriptions of regulations simply can- 
not. This does not mean, however, that market-based proposals 
have no place in the dumping debate. On the contrary, true 
concern for dumping victims demands that one look carefully at 
the underlying economic conditions that make dumping a very 
rational response on the part of private health care providers. 
An emotional attack on "market proposals" and the concept of 
eff1ciencylss as incompatible with "moral feeling"'" is non- 
sense and ought to be recognized for the distraction that it 
represents to anyone genuinely interested in the needs of the 
poor, the unemployed, or the seriously ill who cannot afford 
insurance. 
Dumping will not simply disappear on its own and, for 
reasons I demonstrate below, no amount of (politically feasible) 
regulation will eliminate it. Indeed, some of the human misery 
Insurance Among Health and Insurance Personnel, 266 JAMA 399, 401 (1991). 
133. Id. There is also evidence that a fear of losing employer-subsidized health 
coverage is discouraging the movement of employees from one job to another. See 
Health Benefits Found to Deter Switches in Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at 
Al. 
134. See, eg., Low Medicaid Fees Seen a s  Depriving the Poor of Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, a t  Al; Don Terry, As Medicaid Fees Push Doctors Out, Chi- 
cago Patients Find Fewer Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at  A10. 
135. Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, a d  Democratic Values, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1067-68 (1981) (arguing that market-based proposals for re- 
solving health care issues are "flawed seriously" and reinforce the "hierarchical 
aspects" of health care). The phenomenon of dumping, of course, tends to suggest 
that, at  least from the perspective of the providers, medicine is more of an eco- 
nomic transaction than anything else. Unfortunately, there is no effective mecha- 
nism for making doctors and hospitals see it any other way. 
136. Id. at  1100 (quoting approvingly Laurence Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or 
Iokology?, 2 PHIL. & RJR. AFF. 66, 97 (1972)). 
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engendered by dumping can be laid directly at the door of those 
who unwittingly tinkered with the market in order to produce 
"moral" results. This means that  something is going 
on-economically and politically-which if we continue to ig- 
nore we do so a t  the expense of many lives. 
B. Infeasibility of Eliminating Dumping Through Regulation 
The failure of COBRA and the persistence of dumping are 
not hard to explain if one understands COBRA as a symbolic 
effort of Congress to appear concerned with uninsured pa- 
tients-and nothing more. For economic and political reasons 
which I discuss below, Congress has failed to recognize dump- 
ing as a rational response on the part of providers under given 
circumstances. What is needed is not additional regulation, but 
a recognition that no amount of regulatory effort (accompanied 
by a low probability of detection) can materially affect behavior 
that is dictated to providers by the health care market. 
1. Economic regulation and likelihood of detection 
In his important article,ls7 Professor Stigler describes the 
ways various economic groups may actively "solicit the coercive 
powers of the state"ls8-i.e., regulation. I will not restate all 
the arguments for and against an economic theory of regula- 
tion. Put simply, however, Professor Stigler's theory is that in  
many cases economic regulation is sought by a particular in- 
dustry because the regulation is, itself, beneficial to those being 
regulated.lsg The economic theory of regulation is inconsis- 
137. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
138. Id. at 4. 
139. There is a whole literature which has developed about the economic theory 
of regulation, and several economists have attempted to test Professor Stigler's 
theory. See, eg., FRANK H. STEPHEN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE LAW (1988); William 
A. Niskanen, A Reply to George Stigler: Evaluating Gwernment Policy, Brrs. ECON., 
Jan. 1989, a t  20; Peter J. Boettke, Comment on Joseph Farrell, "Information and 
the Coase Theorem", J .  ECON. PERSP., Spring 1989, a t  195; Frederick H. Harris, 
Economic Negligence, Moral Hazard, and the Coase Theorem, S. ECON. J., Jan. 
1990, a t  698; G l e ~  W. Harrison & Michael McKee, Experimental Evaluation of the 
Coase Theorem, 28 J.L. & ECON. 653 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in 
Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293 (1992); Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, J .  POL. ECON., 
Dec. 1990, a t  1325; James Lindgren, "Ol" Man River . . . He Keeps On Rollin' 
Along: A Reply To Donohue's Diverting the Coasean River, 78 GEO. L.J. 577 (1990); 
Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The 
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tent, of course, with the far more popular notion that regula- 
tion is demanded and secured by reform-minded individuals to 
protect "consumers" from whatever abuses the regulation is 
supposed t o  prevent. (Professor Posner has referred to this view 
as the "public interest" theory140 of regulation.) 
As the &scussion of licensure and staff privileges above 
suggests, the economic theory of regulation is especially attrac- 
tive in this case because of persistent state and federal govern- 
ment failures to force physicians and private hospitals to pro- 
vide unlimited amounts of uncompensated health care. At first 
glance, COBRA, with its fines and the specter of Medicare 
participation forfeiture, would seem to  represent a classic ex- 
ample of "public interest'' regulation. However, as Professor 
Hall has pointed out, COBRA is "an anemic response"141 to 
the problem of increasing the supply of health care for the 
uninsured. As for the penalties, Hall argues that 
[ilt is curious to condition Medicare participation on the man- 
ner in which hospitals treat patients who are almost exclu- 
sively not covered by Medicare. It  is more peculiar still to 
enforce such a condition of participation through methods 
that go beyond termination of participating status. All other 
instances of Medicare civil penalties relate to fraud and abuse 
in the provision of Medicare services . . . . If Congress had a 
genuine concern about the inability of state law to deter inap- 
propriate patient transfers, i t  should have struck directly a t  
the problem without using the contrivance of Medicare partic- 
ipation.'" 
And, in fact, the federal government has, as yet, never resorted 
to stripping a hospital of its Medicare participation status sole- 
ly for a COBRA vi01ation.l~~ As the legislative history of CO- 
Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1984); Warren J. 
Samuels, The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and Economics, 114 NAT. RE- 
SOURCES J. 1 (1974); Mark Wohar, Alternative Versions of the Come Theorem and 
the Definition of Transaction Costs, Q.J. BUS. & ECON., Winter 1988, a t  3. 
140. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. 5321. 335 (1974). 
141. Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 
JURIMETRICS J., 389, 393 (1988). 
142. Id. a t  393-94 (footnote omitted). 
143. Telephone Interview with Rachael Weinstein, HCFA (Jan. 12, 1993). Since 
August 1986, seven hospitals have been stripped of Medicare participation status, 
but it  is important to note that all seven hospitals had other serious violations in 
addition to COBRA. In fact, according to Ms. Weinstein, it  is "fairly easy" for a 
hospital to correct a COBRA violation in order to avoid losing Medicare participa- 
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BRA makes clear, Congress understood that dumping was 
accelerating in direct response to its own increased regulation 
of reimbursement rates, which was making hospitals' cross- 
subsidization from covered to uninsured patients increasingly 
difficult.'" COBRA is merely an example of a regulatory deal 
struck by legislators and interest group producers (i.e., orga- 
nized medicine). COBRA gives the appearance of concern for 
emergency indigent care without requiring any meaningful 
action by hospitals or physicians. 
COBRA does not, then, represent the triumph of advocates 
for the poor and uninsured over the interests of greedy hospi- 
tals and doctors. On the contrary, COBRA provides the appear- 
ance of a solution to the dumping problem (and sends the con- 
current signal that members of Congress are concerned about 
the plight of the uninsured), all the while allowing hospitals t o  
continue to dump a "patient on public facilities once it has ren- 
dered stabilizing COBRA can be viewed as a legisla- 
tive triumph for the hospital facilities it purports to regulate 
and treat harshly in the event a patient is dumped. Congress 
could only have done less by doing nothing at all. 
One other issue bears mention in connection with the regu- 
lation of dumping: the importance of sending credible signals to 
the regulated regarding the regulator's willingness to impose 
serious penalties (as loss of Medicare provider status surely is), 
and a sufficiently high threat of dete~ti0n.l~~ I have noted al- 
ready that HHS has, thus far, demonstrated an unwillingness 
tion status. Id. 
144. Dr. Arnold Relman, of the New England Journal of Medicine, testified be- 
fore Congress that the 
[dlumping of indigent patients is becoming more common these days and 
there is a lot of evidence to that effect, because fewer patients have hos- 
pital insurance and because most insurers, Medicare and Medicaid includ- 
ed, are no longer willing to pay hospitals for the extra costs of cross-sub- 
sidizing the care of those who are uninsured and those who are unable to 
pay for themselves. 
Equal Access to Health Care, supra note 37, at 98 (testimony of Dr. Arnold S. 
Relman, Editor, New England Journal of Medicine). 
145. Hall, supra note 143, at 392. 
146. Much has been written about the relationship between deterrence and pun- 
ishment. A few examples: Steven Klepper & Daniel S. Nagin, The Deterrent Effect 
of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721 
(1989); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 1880 (1991); J. L. Miller & Andy B. Anderson, Updating the Deterrence 
Doctrine, 77 J. CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 418 (1986); R. J. Spjut, Criminal 
Law, Punishment, and Penalties, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STIJD. 33 (1985). 
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to strip offending hospitals of their Medicare provider sta- 
tus.14? Chronically low staffing and other problems a t  
HHS148 have meant that the likelihood of detection is also 
low. 
2. Absence of political consensus 
Market considerations aside, the other major explanation 
for Congress's failure to focus on meaningful access to health 
care (as opposed to stabilization only in emergency situations) 
for the uninsured is, unquestionably, political. There is a lack 
of political consensus about the nature of a citizen's "right" to 
health care. All other Western industrialized countries, except 
South Africa, have affirmed that, like certain political rights, 
everyone is entitled to a minimum level of health care, usually 
determined by the state.14' In the United States this sort of 
discussion makes some people distinctly uncomfortable, partic- 
ularly physicians who rightly suspect that this kind of ap- 
proach could quickly lead to unlimited and uncompensated 
demands for their professional services. Physician opposition 
also stems from a feared loss of autonomy. Lawyers get nervous 
in much the same way when mandated pro bono comes up.lSO 
147. This, of course, is probably not a bad position for the agency to have taken. 
The lack of access to health care a great many elderly would face as a result of a 
hospital's exclusion from the Medicare program might easily outweigh the misery 
inflicted on a few individuals whom the hospital refused to stabilize before trans- 
ferring. 
148. H.R. REP. NO. 531, supra note 92, at 8 ("[Tlhe failure of Health and Hu- 
man Services to issue regulations implenienting the 1986 anti-dumping amendment 
has left thousands of patients at increased risk of illegal transfers."). 
149. The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, for example, provides: 
Everybody has the right to have his or her health protected and cared 
for. The state guarantees this right: 
-by providing free medical and hospital care by means of the in- 
stallations of the rural medical service network, polyclinics, hospitals, 
prophylactic and specialized treatment centers; 
-by providing free dental care; 
-by promoting the health publicity campaigns, regular medical exami- 
nations, general vaccinations and other measures to prevent the out- 
break of disease. All the population cooperates in these activities and 
plans by means of the social and mass organizations. 
CUBA CONST. (1976) ch. VI, art. 49, translated and reprinted in CASTKO'S CURA IN 
THE 1970S, at 167, 174 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1978). 
150. In New York, for example, the State Bar Association proposed increased 
voluntary pro bono efforts by attorneys to head off a proposal for mandatory pro 
bono work. The mandatory proposal was recommended by former Chief Judge Sol 
Wachtler's Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, and called for 
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At the heart of this matter is ambivalence about whether 
health care is a commodity like any other, coupled with some 
reluctance to force physicians to work without compensation. 
(Dr. Burditt made this argument in the Rivera case and it was 
not sympathetically received.)lsl In general, when physicians 
have tried, this line of argument has not been successful.152 
Nonetheless, there is considerable disagreement in our society 
about whether rights-based analysis leads one to the notion of 
a "decent minimum" of health care. As one commentator has 
noted: 
Even if, for instance, there is wide consensus on the consid- 
ered judgment that the lower health prospects of inner-city 
Blacks are not only morally unacceptable but also an injus- 
tice, it does not follow that this injustice consists of the in- 
fringement of a universal right to a decent minimum of 
health care. Instead, the injustice might lie in the failure to 
rectify past injustices or in the failure to achieve public 
health arrangements that meet a reasonable standard of 
equal protect i~n. '~~ 
As for the nature of health care-i.e., whether it is unique and 
therefore resistant to the kind of analysis (economic or other- 
wise) one would impose on any other commodity-there is liter- 
ature about the special role of illness which would seem to 
suggest that the answer is yes.1S4 Arthur Frank, writing 
all practicing attorneys to devote a t  least 20 hours of pro bono work per year. 
Gary Spencer, Bar Panel Rejects Mandatory Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., O d .  24, 1989, a t  
1; see also Ronald H. Silverman, Conceiving A Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 885, 887 (1991) ("The intense debate over the [Wachtler Commit- 
tee] proposal has all too often suffered from excessive moralizing, from a misguided 
and unlawyerly taste for obscuring generalizations, and from the relative absence 
of analytic instruments and useful concepts drawn from disciplines like economics 
and puhlic finance."). 
151. Brief of Appellant Michael L. Burditt at 33, Burditt v. United States Dep't 
of Health & Human Serv., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-4611); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, Texas Hospital Ass'n, in support of Petitioner at  12, Burditt v. 
United States Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 
90-4611); see also supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
152. See? Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 813 (1986); Association of Health Care Facilities v. Minnesota Dep't of 
Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). 
153. Allen Bachanan, Tha Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, in 2 
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIO- 
MEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 211 (1983); 
see also ROBEEV~ P. RHODES, HEALTH CARE: POLITICS, POLICY, AND DISTRIBUTWE 
JUWICE (1992). 
154. See, e.g., MOLLY HASICELL, LOVE AND OTHER INFECTIOZJS DISEASES (1990); 
1020 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
about his own experiences with serious illness-a heart attack 
followed by a diagnosis of testicular cancer-has argued that a 
Canadian-type public health insurance system (as opposed to 
our present patchwork of public and private) is optimal- 
Of course, private insurance provides treatment without 
the ill person having to pay for i t  directly. But private insur- 
ance is just that, available to some but not to all. There is 
nothing private about having cancer; I have never shared so 
self-consciously in the common risk of being human. Cancer 
may have been all I had in common with many of those in 
treatment with me, but cancer defined each of our lives. Be- 
cause we shared cancer, I wanted no less for them than I 
wanted for myself. I did not want my treatment to be a privi- 
lege based on my occupation or income. If cancer occurs with- 
out prejudice, its treatment should be available without preju- 
dice as  well.155 
The response to this, of course, is that many illnesses, includ- 
ing certain cancers, do occur "with prejudice." That is, one of 
the justifications for experience rating is that it  enables people 
who wish to engage in risky behavior--e.g., smoking-to pay 
the price via higher premiums. In addition, nothing about pri- 
vate insurance prohibits the state from subsidizing those who 
could not otherwise afford it. The fact that private insurance is 
not available to everyone is not an argument against private 
insurance, with its attractive tendency to experience rate and 
to allocate the costs of health care to high users efficiently. 
Instead, the access problem is an argument in favor of assisting 
those who are unable to afford private premiums in a way that 
does not stigmatize them. Stigmatization here refers to the 
refusal of many physicians to treat Medicaid patients because 
of the low reimbursement rates. 
I t  is impossible to say with precision how ambivalence 
about expropriating the labor of health care providers contrib- 
utes to cosmetic approaches to dumping like COBRA. Congress 
was aware, though, of the tremendous financial pressures fac- 
ing hospitals and the fact that collectively they provide $12.1 
billion in uncompensated care every year.156 It does not re- 
ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES (1988); SIJSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS 
METAPHOR (1978). 
155. FRANK, supra note 66, at 117-18. 
156. In 1990, hospitals provided uncompensated care totalling $12.1 billion. See 
David Burda, Charity Care: Are Hospitals Giving Their Fair Share?, MOD. HEALTH 
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quire a tremendous amount of legislative sophistication to 
recognize that hospitals cannot provide an  unlimited supply of 
uncompensated care, especially with DRGs forming the basis 
for Medicare reimbursement and private plans scrutinizing 
treatments. 
As stories like Mrs. Rivera's make clear, patient dumping 
is a very serious problem that endangers the lives of many 
(mostly poor) people on a regular basis. Uninsured women in  
labor (and their unborn children) and others with health prob- 
lems that may cause unexpected emergency situations are at 
the most risk. However, providers have also been known to 
dump patients whose insurance has run out or is otherwise 
inadequate. A profile of the uninsured is not exclusively a pic- 
ture of the unemployed because millions of uninsured individu- 
als work full time or are supported by someone who does. Thus, 
the accidental nexus between employment and health insur- 
ance coverage does not entirely explain the crisis of 
noncoverage. 
In spite of evidence to the contrary, Congress has treated 
the problem of patient dumping as one readily amenable to 
regulation via the political process. This is simply not true, 
especially given the powerful economic incentives to dump and 
the relatively low probability of detection that providers face. 
Congress made it much more difficult in the 1980s for hospitals 
to pass on the cost of indigent patient care to other patients, 
and the outcome was entirely predictable: hospitals began to 
provide less uncompensated care and to foist these patients 
onto public institutions whenever possible. Congress's weak 
and ineffective response to increased dumping suggests either 
unimaginable naivete or a desire to appear to be reacting to the 
crisis, all the while permitting the forces it set in motion to 
continue to crush the uninsured. The entire scenario reminds 
one of a parent who, with a wink and a nod, sternly orders a 
child not to take any cookies from the open jar the parent has 
placed just under the child's nose. 
A straightforward assessment of the market for health 
insurance and initiatives that will enable as many people as 
possible to purchase coverage is required. One obvious tactic is 
CARE, June 15, 1992, at 22, Chart 2. 
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to discourage the fifty states from dictating the terms of private 
insurance contracts. This should enable insurers to  offer prod- 
ucts that meet the needs of the working poor, whose demand 
for exotic fertility treatments or prosthetic devices may be lim- 
ited. As for those who would still remain in the pool of unin- 
sured, a direct subsidy that would enable the members of the 
pool t o  obtain coverage is most attractive. 
There is as yet in this country no consensus over the na- 
ture of health care qua consumer product, which consensus will 
be necessary before a move toward universal health insurance 
is possible. In the meantime, which may be a long time, the 
needs of the uninsured (for both emergency and routine care) 
cry out for attention. The answer is not to insist that already 
stressed providers give away an unlimited amount of uncom- 
pensated care; rather, the solution lies in focusing on ways in 
which the numbers of uninsured can be reduced and in subsi- 
dizing coverage for those who cannot obtain it at any price. 
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Appendix: 
State Statutes Regulating Patient Transfers 
Alaska. ALASKA STAT. 5 18.08.086(b) (1991) provides that a 
physician who in good faith arranges for a transfer is not civilly 
liable if the physician: (1) reasonably determines that the treat- 
ment of the patient is beyond the capability of the transferring 
hospital; (2) confirms the receiving hospital is more capable of 
treating the patient; and (3) prior to the transfer, secures a n  
agreement from the receiving hospital to accept and render the 
necessary treatment. 
Arizona. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that  li- 
censed hospitals have a duty to accept and render emergency 
services to all persons who arrive at the facility seeking such 
care. Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp. Inc., 688 P.2d 
605, 610 (Ariz. 1984). 
California. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $ 1317(aj-(e) 
(Deering 1990) provides: 
(a) Emergency services and care shall be provided to any 
person requesting the services or care . . . for any condition in 
which the person is in danger of loss of life, or serious injury 
or illness . . . when the health facility has appropriate facili- 
ties and qualified personnel available to provide the services 
or care. 
(b) In no event shall the provision of emergency services and 
care be based upon, or affected by, the person's . . . insurance 
status, economic status, or ability to pay for medical servic- 
e s . . . .  
(c) Neither the health facility, its employees, nor any physi- 
cian and surgeon . . . shall be liable in any action arising out 
of a refusal to render emergency services or care if the refusal 
is based on the determination, exercising reasonable care, . . . 
that the facility does not have appropriate facilities or quali- 
fied personnel to render those services. 
(d) Emergency services and care shall be rendered without 
first questioning the patient . . . as to his or her ability to pay 
therefor. However, the patient . . . shall execute an agreement 
to pay therefor or otherwise supply insurance or credit infor- 
mation promptly after the services are rendered. 
(e) If a health facility . . . does not maintain an emergency 
department, its employees shall nevertheless exercise reason- 
able care to determine whether an emergency exists and shall 
1024 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
direct the persons seeking emergency care to a nearby facility 
which can render the needed services, and shall assist the 
persons seeking emergency care in obtaining the services 
including transportation services, in every way reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
A separate provision, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
5 1317.2 (Deering 1990), regulates patient dumping. It pro- 
vides: 
No person needing emergency services and care may be trans- 
ferred from a hospital to another hospital for any nonmedical 
reason (such as  the person's inability to pay for any emergen- 
cy service or care) unless each of the following conditions are 
met: 
(a) The person is examined and evaluated by a physician and 
surgeon, including, if necessary, consultation, prior to trans- 
fer. 
(b) The person has been provided with emergency services 
and care so that i t  can be determined, within reasonable 
medical probability, that the transfer or delay caused by the 
transfer will not create a medical hazard to the person. 
(c) A physician and surgeon a t  the transferring hospital has 
notified and has obtained the consent to the transfer by a 
physician and surgeon a t  the receiving hospital and confirma- 
tion by the receiving hospital that the person meets the 
hospital's admissions criteria relating to appropriate bed, 
personnel, and equipment necessary to treat the person. 
(d) The transferring hospital provides for appropriate person- 
nel and equipment which a reasonable and prudent physician 
and surgeon in the same or similar locality exercising ordi- 
nary care would use to effect the transfer. 
(e) All the person's pertinent medical records and copies of all 
the appropriate diagnostic test results which are reasonably 
available are transferred with the person. 
(0 The records transferred with the person include a "Trans- 
fer Summary" signed by the transferring physician and sur- 
geon which contains relevant transfer information[,] . . . [in- 
cluding] the reason for the transfer; and the declaration of the 
signor that the signor is assured, within reasonable medical 
probability, that the transfer creates no medical hazard to the 
patient. . . . 
Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 395.1041 (West Supp. 1993) 
provides for the supplying of emergency care to every person in 
need of such care. Section 395.1041(3) provides that 
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(a) Every general hospital which has an emergency depart- 
ment shall provide emergency services and care for any emer- 
gency medical condition when: 
1. Any person requests emergency services and care; or 
2. Emergency services and care are requested on behalf 
of a person by: 
a. An emergency medical services provider who is 
rendering care to or transporting the person; or 
b. Another hospital, when such hospital is seeking 
a medically necessary transfer, except when other- 
wise provided in this section. 
. . . .  
(c) A patient, whether stabilized or not, may be transferred to 
another hospital which has the requisite service capacity or is 
not a t  service capacity, if: 
1. The patient, or a person who is legally responsible for 
the patient and acting on the patient's behalf, after be- 
ing informed of the hospital's obligation under this sec- 
tion and of the risk of transfer, requests that the trans- 
fer be effected; or 
2. A physician has signed a certification that, based 
upon the reasonable risks and benefits to the patient, 
and based upon the information available a t  the time of 
transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from 
the provision of appropriate medical treatment at an- 
other hospital outweigh the increased risks to the 
individual's medical condition from effecting the trans- 
fer. 
. . . .  
(0 In no event shall the provision of emergency services and 
care, the acceptance of a medically necessary transfer, or the 
return of a patient. . . be based upon, or affected by, the 
person's. . . insurance status, economic status, or ability to 
pay for medical services . . . . 
(g) Neither the hospital nor its employees, nor any physi- 
cian . . . shall be liable in any action arising out of a refusal 
to render emergency services or care if the refusal is based on 
the determination, exercising reasonable care, that the person 
is not suffering from an emergency medical condition or a 
determination, exercising reasonable care, that the hospital 
does not have the service capability or is a t  service capacity to 
render those services. 
(h) Emergency services and care shall be rendered without 
first questioning the patient or any other person as  to the 
patient's ability to pay for the emergency services and care. 
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No hospital to which another hospital is transferring a person 
in need of emergency services and care may require the trans- 
ferring hospital or any person or entity to guarantee payment 
for the person as a condition of receiving the transfer . . . . 
However, the patient or the patient's legally responsible rela- 
tive or guardian shall execute an agreement to pay for 
emergency services or care or otherwise supply insurance or 
credit information promptly after the services and care are 
rendered. 
. . . .  
(j) If a hospital subject to the provisions of this chapter does 
not maintain an emergency department, its employees shall 
nevertheless exercise reasonable care to determine whether 
an emergency medical condition exists and shall direct the 
persons seeking emergency care to a nearby facility which can 
render the needed services and shall assist the persons seek- 
ing emergency care in obtaining the services, including trans- 
portation services, in every way reasonable under the circum- 
stances. 
(k) Emergency medical services providers may not condition 
the prehospital transport of any person in need of emergency 
services and care on the person's ability to pay. Nor may 
emergency medical services providers condition a transfer on 
the person's ability to pay when the transfer is made neces- 
sary because the patient is in immediate need of treatment 
for an emergency medical condition for which the hospital 
lacks service capability or when the hospital is a t  service 
capacity. 
Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. 5 31-8-42 (Michie 1991) provides 
that any hospital operating an emergency service shall be re- 
quired to provide treatment to any pregnant woman in active 
labor who is a resident of the state if such services are usually 
provided in that facility. I t  permits transfers where a physician 
has determined that the facility is unable to provide appropri- 
ate treatment and the facility has: (1) provided emergency 
services as the circumstances require; (2) contacted a receiving 
hospital; (3) arranged transportation if necessary; and (4) sent 
to the receiving facility any available information on the pa- 
tient. 
Hawaii. HAW. REV. STAT. $321-232(b) (1985) provides that 
"no . . . emergency medical services . . . shall be denied to any 
person on the basis of the ability of the person to pay therefor 
or because of the lack of prepaid health care coverage or proof 
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of such ability or coverage." 
Idaho. IDAHO CODE 8 39-139113 (1985) provides that the 
emergency services of a facility cannot be denied to any person 
seeking such aid based upon the person's financial ability to 
Pay 
Illinois. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 112, § 86 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1992) provides that any hospital that offers emergency 
services must furnish such services to any person seeking the 
same when the person suffers from a condition "liable to cause 
death or severe injury or serious illness." 
Ken tucky .  KY.  REV. STAT. ANN. # 216B.400(1) 
(MichieBobbs-Merrill 1991) provides that no person requiring 
emergency service "shall be denied admission by reason only of 
his inability to pay for services to  be rendered by the hospital." 
Louisiana. LA REV. STAT. ANN. 40.21 l3.4(Aj (West 1992) 
provides that any hospital that fulfills the provisions' re- 
quirements and provides emergency services to the public shall 
make such services available t o  all persons in its area regard- 
less of the insurance or inability to pay of the person seeking 
treatment. These requirements also apply to all offices, employ- 
ees, and members of the medical staff of the hospital. Id. 
§ 2113.6(B). 
Maryland. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-308.2 (1990) 
provides that the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
shall adopt guidelines regulating the transfer of patients. At a 
minimum, the transferor must: (1) notify the receiving hospital 
before the transfer and the receiving hospital must confirm 
that the patient meets its admissions criteria; (2) 'stabilize the 
patient before transfer and for its duration; (.3 j provide appro- 
priate personnel and equipment for the transfer; and (4) trans- 
fer "all necessary records for continuing the care for the pa- 
tient." 
Massachusetts. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, 5 70E 
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991) provides a patient bill of rights. The 
enumerated rights include the right of a patient, 
if refused treatment because of economic status or the lack of 
a source of payment, to prompt and safe transfer to a facility 
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which agrees to receive and treat such patient. Said facility 
refbsing to treat such patient shall be responsible for: ascer- 
taining that the patient may be safely transferred; contacting 
a facility willing to treat such patient; arranging the trans- 
portation; accompanying the patient with necessary and ap- 
propriate professional staff to assist in the safety and comfort 
of the transfer, assure that the receiving facility assumes the 
necessary care promptly, and provide pertinent medical infor- 
mation about the patient's condition; and maintaining records 
of the foregoing. 
Id. $ 70E(n). 
Michigan. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 8 333.20921(e) (West 
Supp. 1991) provides that an ambulance operation shall "pro- 
vide life support . . . to all emergency patients without prior 
inquiry into ability to pay or source of payment." 
Missouri. Mo. ANN. STAT. $ 205.989(1) (:Vernon 1983) pro- 
vides that "[nlo person because of inability to pay shall be de- 
nied the services of a . . . public facility or not for profit corpo- 
ration in which a county or participating counties have estab- 
lished services or provided funds . . . ." 
Nevada. NEV. REV. STAT. 8 439B.410(1) (1987) provides 
that "each hospital in this state has an obligation to provide 
emergency services and care . . . and to admit a patient where 
appropriate, regardless of the financial status of the patient." 
In addition, 8 439B.410(2) provides that 
i t  is unlawful for a hospital or a physician working in a hospi- 
tal emergency room, to: 
(a) Refuse to accept or treat a patient in need of emergency 
services and care; or 
(b) Except when medically necessary in the judgment of the 
attending physician: 
(1) Transfer a patient to another hospital or health facil- 
ity unless, as documented in the patients' records: 
(I) A determination has been made that the patient 
is medically fit for transfer; 
(11) Consent to the transfer has been given by the 
receiving physician, hospital or health facility; 
(111) The patient has been provided with an expla- 
nation of the need for the transfer; and 
(IV) Consent to the transfer has been given by the 
patient or his legal representative; or 
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(2) Provide a patient with orders for testing a t  another 
hospital or health facility when the hospital from which 
the orders are issued is capable of providing that testing. 
However, 8 439B.410(4) provides that subsection (2) 
does not prohibit the transfer of a patient from one hospital to 
another: 
(a) When the patient is covered by an insurance policy or 
other contractual arrangement which provides for payment at 
the receiving hospital; 
(b) After the county responsible for payment for the care of an 
indigent patient has exhausted the money which may be 
appropriated for that purpose . . . ; or 
(c) When the hospital cannot provide the services needed by 
the patient. No transfer may be made pursuant to this sub- 
section until the patient's condition has been stabilized to a 
degree that allows the transfer without an additional risk to 
the patient. 
New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 151.21(XVI) 
(Supp. 1991) provides a patient bill of rights which includes the 
right that "[tlhe patient shall not be denied appropriate care on 
the basis of . . . source of payment." Section 151.21(V) states 
that "[tlhe patient shall be transferred or discharged after 
appropriate discharge planning only for medical reasons, for his 
welfare or that of other patients . . . or for nonpayment for the 
patient's stay, except as prohibited by the title XVIII or XIX of 
the Social Security Act." 
New York. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 5 2805-b(l) (McKinney 
1985 & Supp. 1992) provides that 
[elvery general hospital shall admit any person who is in need 
of immediate hospitalization with all convenient speed and 
shall not before admission question the patient . . . concerning 
insurance, credit or payment of charges, provided, however, 
that the patient . . . shall agree to supply such information 
promptly after the patient's admission . . . . No general hospi- 
tal shall transfer any patient to another hospital or health 
care facility on the grounds that the patient is unable to pay 
or guarantee payment for services rendered. Every general 
hospital which maintains facilities for providing out-patient 
emergency medical care must provide such care to any person 
who, in the opinion of a physician, requires such care. 
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Section 2805-b(2) provides that, in cities populated by a million 
or more, "a general hospital shall provide emergency medical 
care and treatment to all persons in need of such care and 
treatment who arrive at the entrance to such hospital therefor." 
Section 2805-b(2)(b) provides that 
[alfter examination, diagnosis and treatment by an attending 
physician and where, in the opinion of such physician, the 
patient has been stabilized sufficiently to permit it, subse- 
quent medical care may be provided or procured by the gener- 
al hospital a t  a location other than the general hospital if, in 
the opinion of the attending physician, it is in the best inter- 
est of the patient because the general hospital does not have 
the proper equipment or personnel at  hand to deal with the 
particular medical emergency or because all appropriate beds 
are filled and none are likely to become available within a 
reasonable time after the patient has been stabilized. 
Section 2805-b(2)(c) provides that if a transfer of an appropri- 
ately stabilized patient is initiated, "the attending physician 
authorizing the transfer . . . shall determine that a receiving 
hospital is available and willing to receive such patient and 
that an attending physician thereat is available and willing to 
admit such patient." A completed form must be sent with the 
transferred patient containing specific information. Section 
2805-b(4) provides that "no person actually in need of emergen- 
cy treatment, as determined by the attending physician, shall 
be denied such treatment by a general hospital in cities with a 
population of one million or more for any reason whatsoever." 
Oregon. OR. REV. STAT. 441.094(1) (1991) provides that 
"[nlo officer or employee of a hospital . . . may deny to a person 
diagnosed by an admitting physician as being in need of emer- 
gency medical services . . . customarily provided at the hospital 
because the person is unable to establish the ability to pay for 
the services." However, $441.094(3) provides that "[a] hospital 
that does not have physician services available a t  the time of 
the emergency shall not be in violation . . . if, after a reason- 
able good faith effort, a physician is unable to provide or dele- 
gate the provision of emergency medical services." 
Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, $449.8(a) (Supp. 
1992) creates an Indigent Care Program on the policy that 
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every person . . . should receive timely and appropriate health 
care services from any provider. . . ; that . . . each provider 
should offer and provide medically necessary, lifesaving and 
emergency health care services to every person in [Pennsylva- 
nia], regardless of financial status or ability to pay; and that 
health care facilities may transfer patients only in instances 
where the facility lacks the staff or facilities to properly ren- 
der definitive treatment. 
Rhode Island. R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 23-17-26(a) (1989) provides 
that 
[elvery health care facility that has an emergency medical 
care unit shall provide to every person prompt life saving 
medical treatment in an emergency, and a sexual assault 
examination for victims of sexual assault without discrimina- 
tion on account of economic status or source of payment, and 
without delaying treatment for the purpose of a prior discus- 
sion of the source of payment unless the delay can be imposed 
without material risk to the health of the person. 
South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. 5 44-7-260(E) (Law. Co-op. 
Supp. 1992) provides that "[nlo person, regardless of his ability 
to pay . . . may be denied emergency care if a member of the 
admitting hospital's medical staff or, in the case of a transfer, a 
member of the accepting hospital's medical staff determines 
that the person is in need of emergency care." 
South Dakota. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 36-4B-25 (1992) 
provides that 
[nlo physician, who in good faith arranges for, requests, rec- 
ommends or initiates the transfer of a patient to a critical 
medical care facility in another hospital, may be liable for 
civil damages as a result of such transfer where sound medi- 
cal judgment indicates that the patient's medical condition is  
beyond the care capability of the transferring hospital, or the 
medical community in which that hospital is located, and 
where the physician has confirmed that the transferee facility 
possesses a more appropriate level of capability for treating 
the patient's medical needs, and where the physician has 
secured a prior agreement from the transferee facility to ac- 
cept and give necessary treatment to the patient. 
Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. 8 68-140-301 (1992) provides 
that "every hospital" which provides emergency services "shall 
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furnish such hospital emergency services to any applicant who 
applies for the same in case of injury or acute medical condition 
where the same is liable to cause death or severe injury or  
illness." Section 68-140-511(12) prohibits "[dliscriminating in 
rendering emergency care because of. . . ability to pay." In 
addition, section 68-11-701 states that "inpatients should 
not .  . . be involuntarily transferred for purely economic rea- 
sons but should receive the needed medical care as required by 
[this act]." 
Texas. TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. $241.027(a) 
(West 1992) provides that the state's health board shall pro- 
mulgate rules that provide minimum standards governing the 
transfer of patients between hospitals. Under $ 241.027(b), 
[tlhe rules must provide that patient transfers . . . be accom- 
plished through hospital policies that result . . . in a medical- 
ly appropriate transfer . . . by providing: 
(1) for notification to the receiving hospital before the 
patient is transferred and confirmation by the receiving 
hospital that the patient meets the receiving hospital's 
admissions criteria relating to  appropriate bed, physi- 
cian, and other services necessary to treat the patient; 
(2) for the use of medically appropriate life support mea- 
sures that a reasonable and prudent physician exercising 
ordinary care in the same or similar locality would use 
to stabilize the patient before the transfer and to sustain 
the patient during transfer; 
(3) for the provision of appropriate personnel and equip- 
ment that a reasonable and prudent physician exercising 
ordinary care in the same or a similar locality would use 
for the transfer; 
(4) for the transfer of all necessary records for continu- 
ing the care for the patient; and 
(5) that the transfer of a patient not be predicated on . . . 
economic status. 
Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 26-8-8(1) (1989) provides that 
"[elmergency medical services shall be provided to all patients 
in need of such services to sustain life or prevent loss of life 
without . . . prior inquiry as to ability to pay." 
Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, $ 1852(a)(8) (.Supp. 1992) 
provides a patient's bill of rights that includes 
the right to expect that within its capacity a hospital shall 
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respond reasonably to the request of a patient for servic- 
es . . . . When medically permissible a patient may be trans- 
ferred to another facility only after receiving complete infor- 
mation and explanation concerning the needs for and alterna- 
tives to such a transfer. The institution to which the patient 
is to be transferred must first have accepted the patient for 
transfer. 
Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 146.301(2) (West 1989 & 
Supp. 199 1) provides that "[nlo hospital providing emergency 
services may refuse treatment to any sick or injured person." In  
addition, 5 146.301(3) provides that "[nlo hospital providing 
emergency services may delay emergency treatment to a sick or 
injured person until credit checks, financial information forms 
or promissory notes have been initiated, completed or signed 
i f .  . . the delay is likely to cause increased medical complica- 
tions, permanent disability or death." However, $ 146.301(3) 
provides that "[nlo hospital may be expected to provide emer- 
gency services beyond its capabilities as identified by the [de- 
partment of health and social services]." 
Wyoming. WYO. STAT. 5 35-2-115(a) (1988) provides that 
[elmergency service and care shall be provided. . . to any 
person requesting such services or care, or for whom such 
services or care is requested, for any condition in which the 
person is in danger of loss of life, or serious injury or illness, 
at any hospital. . . that maintains and operates emergency 
services to the public when such hospital has appropriate 
facilities and qualified personnel available to provide such 
services or care. 
However, 5 35-2-1 l5( b) provides that liability shall not attach 
in any action arising out of a refusal to render emergency 
services or care . . . if ordinary medical care and skill is exer- 
cised in determining the condition of the person, and a deci- 
sion is made that such refusal shall not result in any perma- 
nent illness or injury to such person or a decision is made 
that sufficient qualified personnel are not available to treat 
said person, or a decision is made that facilities or equipment 
are not available to treat said person or in determining the 
appropriateness of the facilities, the qualifications and avail- 
ability of personnel to render such services. 
